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I. INTRODUCTION
All happy families are like one another; each
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.'
Divorce mediation in the context of domestic violence is one of
the most controversial issues in family law today. Some believe
that mediation is never appropriate when domestic violence has
taken place, and others believe that it is always appropriate and
should be mandatory.2 These views can be reconciled by taking a
third approach, that mediation is sometimes appropriate but that
this decision must be made on a case-by-case basis in consultation
with the abuse survivor.
The central premise of this article is that victims of domestic
violence should have the opportunity to make an informed choice
about which divorce process - mediated or adversarial - will best
meet the needs of their families. Because families are different and
because both adversarial and mediated proceedings vary in quality
and accessibility, decisions about what process to use must be made
on an individual basis in light of the real, not theoretical, options
available to the family. The article uses social science research to
(1) establish that families experience different types of violence and
consequently differ from each other in ways that are significant for
choosing a divorce process; (2) provide objective information on how
mediation and the adversarial process compare in terms of overall
effectiveness, satisfaction rates, and compliance with agreements
or orders; and (3) evaluate the extent to which commentators' fears
about mediation and domestic violence have been substantiated.
The article analyzes this information and suggests factors, both
individual and systemic, to be considered in choosing a divorce
process. Finally, the article discusses specific practice safeguards
and makes recommendations for future change.
Part II of this article outlines prevalent theories about the
dynamics of violent relationships and discusses the implications of
these theories with respect to choosing a divorce process. Part III
focuses on the overarching goal of successful divorce as defined by
social scientists. Part IV analyzes common concerns about the
1. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 17 (1961).
2. Compare Carrie-Anne Tondo, et al., Mediation Trends, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 431 (2001)
(arguing that mediation is never appropriate), with Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming
Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q. 177,203-05 (1994)
(arguing that mediation is always appropriate) [hereinafter Reclaiming Professionalism).
2003]
148 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 9:145
impact of the adversary process on families involved in divorce
proceedings. Part V is an overview of the mediation process, and
Part VI examines concerns about its use when domestic violence
has taken place during the marriage. Part VII suggests safeguards
that can be put into place if mediation is undertaken, and Part VII
concludes with recommendations for reforming the decision making
process so that victims of domestic abuse are able to make intelli-
gent, informed choices about the use of mediation in the divorce
process.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT RELATIONSHIPS
A. History
Although awareness of domestic violence has increased over the
last fifty years, the problem is hardly a new one. Domestic violence
has been documented as far back as Ancient Rome3 and continues
to the present day. Prior to the 1870s, physical "chastisement" of
a wife was seen as a husband's legal prerogative in the exercise of
his property rights.4 Though this behavior is now illegal, our
society remains ambivalent about intervening in family matters.'
B. Statistics
Domestic violence occurs frequently and persistently in our
society. Nearly one-third of women will be physically assaulted by
an intimate partner sometime during adulthood.6 Ongoing violence
takes place in at least 25% of American homes.7
3. Kathleen O'Connell Corcoran & James C. Melamed, From Coercion to Empowerment:
Spousal Abuse and Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 303, 304 (1990); Michelle J. Nolder, The
Domestic Violence Dilemma: Private Action in Ancient Rome and America, 81 B.U. L. REV.
1119,1120(2001).
4. See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing
Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics ofAbusive Relationships,
15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 116 (1991); Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 3, at 304.
5. Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a
Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 1345, 1360 (1997).
6. ABA Network, ABA Commission on Domestic Violence, Statistics (citing BUREAU OF
JUjSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS: VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 2 (1994)), available
at http'J/www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html.
7. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 20 (1979); Asmus et al., supra note 4, at
120-21.
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Ninety to ninety-five percent of domestic abuse victims are
women 8 and women are ten times more likely to be abused by an
intimate partner than are men.9 Women of all races are victimized
equally,' ° although women who are young, ages 19-29," and poor'2
are more likely to be abused.' 3 Consistent with the finding that
younger women experience more violence, researchers have
estimated that one-third of girls younger than twenty have been or
will be subjected to dating violence before reaching adulthood. 14
Abuse is likely to start or escalate during pregnancy. 5 Fifty
percent of abusive men batter their partners during pregnancy and
this results in a fourfold increase in the likelihood of low birth
weights for the children of these women. 6 In light of this prenatal
child abuse, it is not surprising that men who abuse their wives also
abuse their children. About half of the children growing up in
violent homes are also physically abused by the batterer. 7
8. NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GorrMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS
INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 34 (1998); ABA Network, supra note 6 (citing
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY: REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE
FAMILY, 10 (1996)); Sheila Murphy, Guardians Ad Litem: The Guardian Angels of Our
Children in Domestic Violence Court, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 281, 289 (1999). Because of these
statistics, this article will refer to the victim as being a woman.
9. ABA Network, supra note 6 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED
FINDINGS: VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 2 (1994)); ABA Commission on Domestic Violence,
Multidisciplinary Responses to Domestic Violence, available at
http'J/www.abanet.org/domviol/mrdv/facts.html.
10. ABA Network, supra note 6 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 3 (1995)); WALKER,
supra note 7, at 21.
11. ABA Network, supra note 6 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 4 (1995)).
12. Id. (citing JODY RAPHAEL & RICHARD M. TOLMAN, TRAPPED BY POVERTY, TRAPPED BY
ABUSE: NEW EVIDENCE DOCUMENTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
WELFARE 21 (1997), available at http'J/www.ssw.umich.edu/trapped/pubs.html).
13. Richard J. Gelles, Domestic Violence Factoids, Minnesota Center Against Violence
and Abuse, available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/papers/factoid.htm.
14. Kathryn E. Suarez, Teenage Dating Violence: The Need for Expanded Awareness and
Legislation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 423,426 (1994) (citing Sheila J. Kuehl, Legal Remedies for Teen
Dating Violence, in DATING VIOLENCE: YOUNG WOMEN IN DANGER 209 (Barrie Levy ed.,
1991)).
15. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW
SOCIETY RESPONDS 136 (1989); Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact
of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1047 (1991).
16. HOWARD DAVIDSON, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN, A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1 (1994).
17. JEFFREY L. EDLESON, THE OVERLAP BETWEEN CHILD MALTREATMENT AND WOMAN
ABUSE 2 (1999), available at httpJ/www.vaw.umn.edu/finaldocuments/Vawnet/overlap.pdf;
N. Zoe Hilton, Introduction, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND
EVALUATION, 15 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (citing Ten Facts About Violence Against Women:
Hearing on Women and Violence Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 78
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The remaining children, who are not themselves physically
hurt, suffer the traumatic effects of witnessing their mother's
assault. 8 These children are more likely to run away, use drugs
and alcohol, and attempt suicide. 9 Boys who grow up in violent
homes are twice as likely to become batterers themselves.2"
Children are more likely to be concurrently abused in cases where
the spousal abuse has been especially severe.2' In extreme cases,
the batterer may abduct the child22 or murder the mother and/or
the child.2"
Unfortunately, even if the woman decides to leave the batterer,
this does not mean that the abuse will end. In fact, separation may
trigger abuse even if abuse has not previously occurred in the
relationship.24 When there has been a pattern of abuse, the woman
is in particular danger because the violence is likely to escalate
upon separation.25
(1990)); Marjory D. Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and Its Relevance in
Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 224 (1994)
(citing Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective
on Child Abuse, 18 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 97, 106 (1988)); Susan Schechter & Jeffrey L.
Edleson, In the Best Interests of Women and Children:A Call for Collaboration Between Child
Welfare and Domestic Violence Constituencies, 386 ISSUES OF THE MINN. LEGAL SERVICES
COALITION 1, 2 (1999) available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/papers/wingsp.htm.
18. JEFFREY L. EDLESON, PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CHILDREN'S WITNESSING OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 12-13 (1999), available at
http'J/www.vaw.umn.edu/finaldocumentsNawnetwitness.pdf; Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims:
Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children Through Statutory Termination
of Parental Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757,760 (1996).
19. MARIA Roy, CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE: VIOLENCE IN THE HOME - How DOES IT
AFFECT OUR CHILDREN? 103-04 (1988).
20. Hilton, supra note 17, at 11; Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child
Custody Disputes: From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management,
22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 417 (2000) [hereinafter The Evolving Judicial Role]
(citing JANET R. JOHNSON & VIVIAN ROSEBY, IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT
DIVORCE 5 (1997)).
21. Joan B. Kelly & Lynn L. Gigy, Divorce Mediation: Characteristics of Clients and
Outcomes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH 65 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989); Schechter &
Edleson, supra note 17, at 23, 41.
22. ELIZABETH M. ELLIS, DIVORCE WARS: INTERVENTIONS WITH FAMILIES IN CONFLICT 257
(2000).
23. ABA Network, supra note 6 (citing FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, FLORIDA MORTALITY REVIEW PROJECT 45 (1997)).
24. LINDA GIRDNER, ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, DOMESTIC ABUSE AND
CUSTODY MEDIATION TRAINING FOR JUDGES AND ADMINISTRATORS: INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, 12
(1999).
25. Id.; Gelles, supra note 13 (citing Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide
Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 3, 3-16).
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C. Definition
The term "domestic violence" connotes different behaviors to
different people. Some social scientists define it as a pattern of
coercive behavior used to control an intimate partner. 6
Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive behavior that changes
the dynamics of an intimate relationship within which it occurs.
Once the pattern of coercive control is established, both parties
understand differently the meaning of specific actions and
words. Domestic violence is not simply a list of discrete
behaviors, but is a pattern of behavior exhibited by the batterer
that includes words, actions, and gestures, which, taken
together, establish power and control over an intimate
partner.
This definition emphasizes the idea that the abuse defines the
fundamental dynamics of the relationship, creating an ongoing
coercive context for behavior that might not otherwise be seen as
threatening. It includes psychological abuse, financial abuse,
physical attack, and sexual assault. It is consistent with and
describes the "culture of battering."
Legal definitions of abuse differ from social science definitions
in that the law focuses on specific incidents of physical abuse. For
example, the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence defines
domestic violence as follows:
Domestic or family violence means the occurrence of one or
more of the following acts by a family or household member, but
does not include acts of self defense:
(a) Attempting to cause or causing physical harm to another
family or household member;
(b) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical
harm; or
(c) Causing a family or household member to engage involun-
tarily in sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress.28
26. See Mary Ann Dutton, Expert Witness Testimony, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § 8-81, § 8-8
(Deborah M. Goelman et al. eds., 1996).
27. Id.
28. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 102 (1994).
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This definition includes acts such as pushing, slapping, choking,
punching, use of weapons, and rape. 9 These actions may or may
not be part of a larger pattern of coercion and control.
Definitions of domestic violence are difficult to apply because
domestic violence encompasses a continuum of behavior that might
start with ridicule and ultimately end in homicide.3 ° As will be
explored later, the term "domestic violence" is too often wielded as
a blunt instrument when more precision is warranted. Each
domestic violence survivor falls in a different place on the contin-
uum of abuse, and the unique experience of each victim must be
considered in context when choosing legal and nonlegal remedies.
D. Types of Violence
Domestic violence advocates and mediators have historically
disagreed about the propriety of mediating divorces involving
domestic violence. Women's advocates have often opposed its use
while mediators have favored using it in this context. These
divergent points of view have emerged, in part, because each
professional group has a different perspective concerning the causes
and characteristics of domestic abuse.3' As the following analysis
suggests, both groups may be observing valid but different phenom-
ena. Family violence is simply more varied and complex than was
originally contemplated.
1. Walker's "Cycle of Violence" Theory
Early ground-breaking work on the dynamics of family violence
was popularized by Lenore Walker in the late 1970s. She theorized
that violent couples become enmeshed in an insidious, repetitive
cycle of violence and control. She labeled the initial phase of the
cycle the "tension-building" phase.32 During this phase, stressors
such as finances, work, children, illness, and relationship problems
accumulate as the tension within the batterer builds.3 Eventually,
the tension escalates to a point where an acute, violent incident
29. See Dutton, supra note 26, at § 8-8; Benjamin Mackoffet al.,Mediation, and Family
Law, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, § 13-1, (Anne V. Swanson, et al., 2001).
30. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1991).
31. Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their
Children in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273,275 (1999); The
Evolving Judicial Role, supra note 20, at 419.
32. WALKER, supra note 7, at 56.
33. Id. at 56-59.
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occurs.
34 Immediately following the violence, the couple enters the
honeymoon phase during which the abuser expresses extreme
contrition and remorse and seeks to win the victim's forgiveness.35
Unless the cycle is broken, it will be repeated with each journey
through the phases proceeding more quickly and resulting in more
severe injury.3 6 This repeated violence allows the abuser to assert
increasing control over the victim's life.37
A woman caught in the cycle of violence develops low self
esteem, becomes socially isolated, believes that she has caused the
violence, and may suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) with accompanying flashbacks, anxiety, and depression.38
She is likely to stay with the abuser because she is fearful, economi-
cally dependent, and may have a continuing emotional attachment
to him.3 9
Under Walker's theory, men who batter exhibit pathological
jealousy, blame the victim for the violence, and are also capable of
being charming manipulators.40 These contrasting characteristics
make these abusers seem unpredictable.
Although Walker's theory has been widely accepted, it has also
been subject to criticism for being too limited, especially with
respect to her passive characterization of the victim as suffering
from "learned helplessness."4' In contrast, some commentators
have noted that many battered women actively seek help and
openly rebel against the abuser.42 "In actuality, battered women
are a diverse group: some are economically independent, others
economically dependent, most are angry, most fight back verbally,
many fight back physically, and many are jealous of batterers who
use the infidelity to inflict (psychological) injury on their
34. Id. at 59 (describing the second phase of the cycle).
35. Id. at 65.
36. Id. at 69.
37. Id. at 59.
38. JACOBSON & G'orrMAN, supra note 8, at 50; WALKER, supra note 7, at 31; Jennifer P.
Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of Custody in the Face of Domestic Violence: Suggestions for
Courts and Mediators, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 335, 341 (1999).
39. RICHARD J. GELLES, FAMILY VIOLENCE 96 (1987); JACOBSON & GOTIMAN, supra note
8, at 49.
40. WALKER, supra note 7, at 26, 36 (1979).
41. Mary Ann Dutton, Critique of the "Battered Woman Syndrome" Model, available at
httpJ/www.vaw.umn.edu/finaldocument/Vawnettbws.htm (explaining a victim's inability to
protect herself following repeated failed efforts to do so).
42. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117,2136 (1993).
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partners."43 Consequently, other researchers have expanded upon
Walker's work.
2. Johnston and Campbell
Janet Johnston and Linda Campbell recognize the cycle of
violence relationship described by Lenore Walker. However, they
found violent families that do not fit Walker's profile.44 They
theorize that there are five distinct profiles of domestic violence and
that each type requires a different response.
Their first profile, "ongoing and episodic male battering," is
consistent with Lenore Walker's theory. The males in this profile
are easily frustrated, exhibit poor impulse control, and are jealous
and domineering.4" When violence occurs, it is usually severe and
the danger from the batterer increases at separation.46 Some of the
victims suffer from "battered wife syndrome," but others leave the
relationship as soon as the abuse becomes evident. 47
The second profile, "female-initiated violence," entails violent
outbursts by women who throw things, scratch, and kick.48 The
husband, although intimidated, usually remains more composed
and the violence does not escalate.49
The third profile, "male-controlling interactive violence," begins
with a disagreement that eventually turns into a physical struggle.
The male usually prevails by overpowering the woman but he does
so without using excessive force.5" These relationships are not
characterized as fearful and violence usually ends upon
separation.5
The fourth profile, "separation-engendered and post divorce
trauma," involves violence that erupts at separation but is not
43. Mary Becker, The Passions of Battered Women: Cognitive Links Between Passion,
Empathy, and Power, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 72 (2001).
44. Janet R. Johnston & Linda E. G. Campbell, Parent-Child Relationships in Domestic
Violence Families Disputing Custody, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 282,282-83 (1993).
45. Id. at 286.
46. Id. at 286-87,
47. JANETJOHNSTON & VIVIENNE ROSEBY, IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT
DIVORCE 30 (1997).
48. Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at 291; JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at
33.
49. Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at 291.
50. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 35. Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at
292.
51. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 36; Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at
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present through the marriage.52 The partner who feels abandoned
is likely to initiate the violence.53
The fifth profile, "psychotic and paranoid reactions," involves
active psychosis on the part of the violent spouse." Individuals in
this profile are likely to cling to conspiracy theories and to be
delusional.55 These abusers are quite dangerous.
In a related work, Johnston and Roseby propose that "the
propensity for domestic violence derives from multiple sources and
follows different patterns in different families, rather than being a
syndrome with a single underlying cause."56 They recommend that
mediation be avoided with abusers in the first (ongoing and episodic
male battering) and last (psychotic and paranoid reactions)
categories but would consider adapted mediation with couples in
the second, third, and fourth groups.57
3. Hanks
Susan E. Hanks has developed a typology of family violence
that is similar to the Johnston formulation. She hypothesizes four
distinct types of abuse.58
Type I involves "violence as an acute affective storm within a
primary relationship manifesting a failure to master a family
developmental stage and/or cope with an overwhelming life crisis."59
This violence may have occurred more than once but it is not a
pattern within the relationship. In fact, the couple may be
surprised by the event and seek help. ° Hanks' Type I characteriza-
tion is more general than Johnston's fourth profile, separation and
post divorce violence.6
52. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 35; Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at
293.
53. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 38; Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at
294.
54. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 40; Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at
294-95.
55. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 40; Johnston & Campbell, supra note 44, at
295.
56. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 42.
57. Id. at 4243.
58. Susan E. Hanks, Translating Theory into Practice, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 163-72 (Emilio Viano ed., 1992).
59. Id. at 163-64.
60. Id. at 163.
61. Janet Johnston, Response to Clare Dalton's 'When Paradigms Collide: Protecting
Battered Parents and Their Children in the Family Court System," 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 422,426 (1999).
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Type II involves "repetitive violent rages in the primary
relationship manifesting the man's intolerable internal affective
states."62 This violence starts early in the relationship and occurs
in regular patterns with increasing intensity. The woman may
exhibit the behaviors ascribed to the battered woman's syndrome."
This type is similar to Johnston's first profile, ongoing or episodic
male battering, and Walker's cycle of violence.64
Type III involves a "habitual violent interpersonal style in
multiple relationships used for intimidation and control." 5 The
abuser uses the violence to achieve a goal or to control the victim.
The violence is ongoing and dangerous with likely involvement of
the criminal system.66 This type is more severe than Johnston's
third profile, male controlling interactive abuse. v
Type IV involves "repetitive acute violent behavior in multiple
relationships secondary to severe mental disorder and/or drug or
alcohol addiction."6" This type of violence is associated with serious
mental illness and/or chemical addiction. 9 The violence is not
necessarily directed at family members although they are often the
victims.7v Type IV violence is similar to Johnston's psychotic and
paranoid reactions profile.7 '
4. Ellis and Stuckless
Ellis and Stuckless hypothesize three conceptions of spousal
violence. The first type, "conflict instigated violence," is used by
spouses "as a tactic of conflict resolution."72 This violence is equally
likely to originate from the woman as the man.73 The second type,
"control instigated abuse," is motivated by the abuser's desire to
control the victim and may involve inflicting pain beyond that
necessary to "resolve" the conflict.74 The male is significantly more
62. Hanks, supra note 58, at 165.
63. Id. at 165-66.
64. Johnston, supra note 61, at 426.
65. Hanks, supra note 58, at 170.
66. Id.
67. Johnston, supra note 61, at 426.
68. Hanks, supra note 58, at 172.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. JOHNSTON, supra note 61, at 426-27.
72. DESMOND ELLIS & NOREEN STUCKLESS, MEDIATING AND NEGOTIATING MARITAL
CONFLICTS 34 (1996).
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id. at 2.
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likely to instigate this type of abuse 5 and this is the type of abuse
associated with the "culture of battering."76 The third type, "anger-
instigated violence," flows from an overwhelming emotional state
that results in a violent outburst.77 Making the situation more
complex, Ellis and Stuckless believe that all three types of abuse
can exist simultaneously in a given situation.78
5. Jacobson and Gottman
Jacobson and Gottman focused their research on men who
abuse. They suggest that there are two basic types of batterers,
which they have characterized as "cobras" and "pit bulls". 7
Cobras commit more severe violence and are more likely to use
weapons.8 1 Seventy-eight percent come from violent homes8 ' as do
20% of their wives.12 Forty-four percent are violent outside the
family as well as within it. 3 They tend to exhibit more mental
illness84 and their wives tend to be fearful and depressed rather
than angry. 5 Cobra couples are less likely to divorce or separate.8 6
Cobras are similar to Hank's Type III abusers, 7 although somewhat
less severe than Johnston and Campbell's male controlling interac-
tive abuse. 8 Cobras, who are estimated to be 20% of abusers,
actually experience a decrease in heart rate as their aggression
escalates. This distinguishes them from their counterparts, the pit
bulls, whose heart rates increase as they become more violent.8 9
Pit bulls are prone to emotional outbursts 9 and are less
calculated than cobras in their use of violence.9' They are seldom
75. Id. at 16.
76. Fischer et al., supra note 42, at 2117-18.
77. ELLIS& STUCKLESS,supra note 72, at34; Geri S. Fuhrmann et al., Parent Education's
Second Generation: Integrating Violence Sensitivity, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 24,
26(1999).
78. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 34.
79. JACOBSON & GOiTMAN, supra note 8, at 28.
80. Id. at 93.
81. Id. at 94.
82. Id. at 97.
83. Id. at 96.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 95.
86. Id.
87. See HANKS, supra note 58, at 170.
88. Johnston, supra note 61, at 427.
89. JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 8, at 28-30.
90. Id. at 121.
91. Id.
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violent outside the marriage.92 However, pit bulls are more
demanding of their wives and seek more control over their wives'
behavior.93 Interestingly, the wives of pit bulls exhibit more anger
and less fear than the wives of cobras.94 Pit bull wives exhibit
behavior similar to wives exposed to Hank's Type II abuse95 and
Johnston and Campbell's ongoing male battering.9 In contrast to
Lenore Walker's learned helplessness theory, Jacobsen and
Gottman found these abused women to be resourceful,97 angry, and
outraged.9 Jacobsen and Gottman express more hope for the
rehabilitation of pit bulls than for cobras."
Jacobson and Gottman suggest that chances of eliminating
abuse are increased when the abuser (1) takes responsibility for the
violence, (2) has an internal code of ethics that prohibits violence,
(3) has not been successful at controlling the victim, (4) exhibits low
levels of emotional abuse and domineering behavior, (5) experiences
marital satisfaction, (6) does not abuse drugs or alcohol, and (7) has
been held accountable for the violence."
6. Miles
Joanna Miles views domestic violence in two ways. First
domestic violence is an individual "micro-level" problem that should
be dealt with on an individual or family level.' Second, it is a
"macro-level" problem stemming from the subordination of women
in a male-dominated society.'12 Perhaps the reality is that both
micro-level and macro-level factors are involved.
92. Id.; see also Lenore M. J. Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal
Processing of Domestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 43, 49 (1995).
93. JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 8, at 118.
94. Id. at 119.
95. See HANKS, supra note 58, at 165.
96. Johnston, supra note 61, at 427.
97. JACOBSON & GOrTMAN, supra note 8, at 33.
98. Id. at 64.
99. Id. at 275.
100. Id. at 195-99.
101. Joanna Miles, Domestic Violence, in FAMILY LAW 81 (Jonathan Herring ed., 2001).
See also Renata Vaselle-Augenstein & Annette Ehrilich, Male Batterers: Evidence for
Psychopathology, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 139 (Emilio C.
Viano ed., 1992) (arguing that batterers evidence psychopathology).
102. Miles, supra note 101, at 83. See Cahn, supra note 15, at 1054.
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E. Implications of the Research
The above theories present a more sophisticated understanding
of domestic violence than was previously available. Taken as a
whole, this research demonstrates that families experience different
types of violence and that within each type of violence, the abuse
may vary in frequency and intensity. This understanding makes it
possible to more fully and thoughtfully assess the dynamics of
individual violent relationships.
Because families experiencing domestic violence are very
different from each other, "one size fits all" solutions are inade-
quate. No one divorce process will be "right" for all violent divorc-
ing couples. However, the relationship patterns identified in the
research can be helpful in deciding whether a mediated or ad-
versarial divorce process is more appropriate for a particular
family.
To evaluate the potential benefits versus the harms of media-
tion, we must first clarify our understanding of "domestic
violence" and "battered women." Most mediation proponents
agree that there are some cases where mediation is simply
inappropriate, a fact that many opponents of mediation seem
oftentimes to ignore. Those who argue emphatically against
mediation tend to assume that the couple is involved in a
pervasive "culture of battering," whereby the woman has been
so brutalized and demoralized by her abusive partner that she
is rendered a passive shadow of her former self, unable to
bargain in any meaningful way. However, this ignores the
reality of a "continuum" of family violence, ranging from
pervasive abuse to occasional violence. It is the contention of
many that "[mediation can be an appropriate and effective
problem-solving technique with at least a percentage of those
persons whose lives have been touched at some point by vio-
lence."
10 3
III. THE GOAL: SUCCESSFUL DIVORCE
Domestic relations cases constitute the fastest growing
segment of civil cases heard in the state courts.0 4 In fact, domestic
relations cases have increased by 70% since 1984 and many of these
103. Rene L. Rimelspach, Mediating Family Disputes in a World with Domestic Violence:
How to Devise a Safe and Effective Court-Connected Mediation Program, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 95, 100-01 (2001).
104. The Evolving Judicial Role, supra note 20, at 399.
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cases involve children.' Forty percent of children will participate
in the divorce of their parents0 6 and half of all children will live
with one parent prior to reaching adulthood. 107
When a relationship breaks down, the goal should be to achieve
a "successful" divorce. This is a divorce where "the adults are able
to work through their anger, disappointment, and loss in a timely
manner and terminate their spousal relationship with each other
(legally and emotionally), while at the same time retaining or
rebuilding their parental alliance with and commitment to their
children."' 8
Unfortunately, research suggests that there are a large number
of unsuccessful divorces. About one-fourth to one-third of couples
experience continued conflict and hostility even after the divorce is
final.0 9 Researchers estimate that 10% of divorcing couples
demonstrate "unremitting animosity" as their children grow up.1°
This is of special concern because of mounting evidence connecting
the level of parental conflict with poor post- divorce adjustment of
children."'
The path to a successful divorce is different for each couple and
is especially difficult when domestic violence has occurred. For
example, in such cases, the goal of forming a "parental alliance"
may be unrealistic and even dangerous. Nevertheless, the couple
will have some level of involvement concerning the children, and
this contact needs to be carefully structured. What divorce process
will be the safest and the most helpful to these families? Although
this is an individual decision, social science research concerning the
experiences of divorcing couples, as discussed in the next sections,
can be enlightening.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE ADVERSARIAL DIVORCE PROCESS
In recent years, a variety of parents and professionals have
questioned whether it is appropriate to use the adversary system to
105. Id. at 399 (citing Brian J. Ostrom & Neil B. Kauder, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 39 (1996)).
106. Stephen J. Bahr, Social Science Research on Family Dissolution: What It Shows and
How It Might Be of Interest to Family Law Reformers, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 5 (2002).
107. MARY R. CATHCART & ROBERT E. ROBLES, PARENTING OUR CHILDREN: IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE NATION 11 (1996).
108. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 3.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id.
111. ELLIS, supra note 22, at 184-85; Linda Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Child-
ren in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495,497 (2001);.
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resolve family issues. While many of these concerns have merit,
they must be considered in context. Divorcing couples are a diverse
group 112 and the adversary system is actually a combination of
different processes," 3 including uncontested cases, negotiated
settlements, and cases that go to trial."4 For example, an esti-
mated 50% of custody cases are uncontested 15 and the parents
involved in the dissolution report negligible conflict." 6 Most of the
remaining custody cases are settled, with less than 2% ultimately
resolved by the judge." v However, about half of the contested cases
involve substantial or intense conflict over custody." 8 Thus, cases
are actually resolved through a variety of processes under the
umbrella of the adversary system.
A. The Theory of the Adversary Approach
The adversary process is based on the idea "that two or more
professional adversaries representing the parties to the dispute will
draw forth all relevant information to the contest in the process of
putting forward their clients' best positions, thereby allowing the
decision-maker to determine the 'truth' and to make the best
decision."" 9
An apparent weakness of the adversary system is that it
assumes that the parties bring equal skill and power, in the form
of an attorney and economic support, to bear upon the case. 20
However, the parties often are not evenly matched in this regard,
and there is no mechanism in place to compensate for the mis-
match.' 2' This is particularly true in cases involving domestic
violence because some batterers use the court system as a forum to
112. See Andrew Schepard, War and PEACE: A Preliminary Report and a Model Statute
on an Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and Separating Parents, 27 U.
MICH. J.L, REFORM 131, 150 (1993) [hereinafter War and PEACE].
113. Carol J. King, Burdening Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation on the
Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 275, 431 (1999).
114. ELLIS, supra note 22, at 116-17; King, supra note 113, at 113.
115. ELEANORE. MACCOBY& ROBERT J. MNOOKIN, DIVIDINGTHE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 137 (1997).
116. Id. at 141.
117. Id. at 137.
118. Id. at 141; King, supra note 113, at 431.
119. Janet Weinstein,And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and
the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79,82 (1997).
120. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 22 (1996).
121. Ann Milne & Jay Folberg, The Theory and Practice of Divorce Mediation: An
Overview, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds.,
1998).
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harass and intimidate the abuse survivor by engaging in traumatic
and expensive ongoing litigation.
122
The adversary system is premised on the notion that the judge
is able to ascertain what is best for the family, determine who is
right and wrong,123 and arrive at the "correct" solution.' 4 Critics
argue that the adversary model discounts the importance of the
emotional and psychological concerns of the parties and places
judges in an impossible role for which most have not been ade-
quately trained. 25  A Maryland study found that some family
judges "display either a lack of interest, a lack of temperament, or
a lack of understanding with respect to these cases."'26 In reality,
judges are asked to resolve family conflicts that neither the parties
nor any other professionals have been able to settle.12
Although most divorce cases are eventually settled, the
adversary process has come under scrutiny because, not knowing
which cases will be settled, all cases are prepared and processed as
if they were proceeding to trial. 21 Consequently, at the outset of
the divorce, spouses separately consider their options within the
context of a win/lose framework and helping professionals too
quickly become advocates rather than problem solvers. 129 As a
result, the couple's pressing needs and common interests are
ignored while their differences are emphasized. 3 ° The process
becomes unnecessarily confrontational'' and sometimes less than
helpful to an already stressed family. Thus, the adversary system
may be inappropriate for some families who have experienced
122. Katherine M. Reihling, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence and Their Children
After Divorce: The American Law Institute Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393,394
(1999).
123. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 11.
124. Weinstein, supra note 119, at 112.
125. Christy L. Hendricks, Note, The Trend Toward Mandatory Mediation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes of Minor Children: An Overview, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 491, 495
(1993). See Weinstein, supra note 119, at 105.
126. Jessica Pearson, Court Services: Meeting the Needs of Twenty-First Century Families,
33 FAM. L.Q. 617, 628 (1999) [hereinafter Court Services].
127. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 223.
128. OREGON TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW, CREATING A NEW FAMILY CONFLICT
RESOLUTION SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT TO GOV. JOHN A. KITZHABER AND THE OREGON
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 4 (1997) [hereinafter OREGON TASK FORCE]; The Evolving Judicial
Role, supra note 20, at 410.
129. Weinstein, supra note 119, at 100.
130. King, supra note 113, at 377.
131. Bill Ezzell, Note, Inside the Minds of America's Family Law Courts: The Psychology
of Mediation Versus Litigation in Domestic Disputes, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 119, 124
(2001).
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domestic violence because the process has the potential to exacer-
bate already dangerous conflict." 2
B. Dissatisfaction With the Adversarial Process
Divorcing couples express overwhelming dissatisfaction with
the adversarial approach to divorce. A prominent study found that
50% to 70% of litigants thought that the legal system was "imper-
sonal, intimidating, and intrusive."'33 In another study, 71% of
parents reported that the court process escalated the level of
conflict and distrust "to a further extreme." 34 Divorcing couples
were also disappointed because the process was too lengthy, too
costly, too inefficient, and not sufficiently tailored to their needs.'35
These are not attributes of a system that would be helpful to
families already torn by violence.
C. Dissatisfaction With Attorneys
In addition to being dissatisfied with the legal system, many
divorcing couples are also unhappy with their attorneys. The
dissatisfaction correlates with the higher numbers of ethical
complaints that are filed against family attorneys than those
practicing in other fields. 36 In a recent survey, divorcing parents
described their attorneys as lacking genuine interest in their cases
and not paying sufficient attention to the matter.137 These parents
felt excluded from decisions and found attorney communication
lacking: "nobody hears you and nobody talks to you." 3 In their
defense, attorneys claim that divorce clients often have unrealistic
expectations and enter the system at a time of great emotional
turmoil.
139
Historically, the family law attorney is trained as an advocate
to act "from a purely partisan perspective, to strategically maneu-
ver the presentation of evidence and evoke statutes and case law in
132. Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 102.
133. CATHCART & ROBLES, supra note 107, at 39.
134. Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jackson, The Lawyer's Role During the Divorce
Process: Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children,and TheirAttorneys, 33 FAM. L.Q. 283,
298(1999).
135. Id. at 299.
136. The Evolving Judicial Role, supra note 20, at 410.
137. Pruett & Jackson, supra note 134, at 296.
138. Id. at 297.
139. War and PEACE, supra note 112, at 135 n.8.
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order to win the client's case." 4 ° Commentators have suggested
that family clients are not well served by unchecked zealous
advocacy 141 and have urged attorneys to reexamine this traditional
role.142 The role of counselor may be more appropriate than that of
advocate. 143 Participants at the Wingspread Conference suggest
that attorneys have an affirmative responsibility to promote conflict
resolution.144
140. Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships with the
Court on Behalf of High-Conflict Divorcing Families and their Children: Who Needs What
Kind of Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 453,459 (2000).
141. Kathryn E. Maxwell, Preventive Lawyering Strategies to Mitigate the Detrimental
Effects of Client's Divorces on Their Children, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 137, 152 (1998).
142. Pauline H. Telser, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 967,983-84 (1999).
143. Maxwell, supra note 141, at 152-53.
144. See The Wingspread Report andAction Plan, High Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming
the System for Children, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 146, 150 (2001) [hereinafter Wingspread]:
THE LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROMOTE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
a. Lawyers should diligently exercise their counseling function in assisting
their clients to avoid inappropriate conflict in dealing with custody-related
issues, including the ways in which the parties and counsel pursue
litigation. Lawyers should discuss with client parents the negative
consequences of custody conflicts and disputes on their children and should
advise parents about the availability of resources to reduce conflict.
b. Lawyers should discuss alternatives to litigation, such as mediation, with
the clients.
c. As a general rule, lawyers should encourage their clients to cooperate with
forensic custody and mental health evaluations.
d. Lawyers have a duty to realistically evaluate their client's case and not
raise false expectations.
e. Lawyers should encourage early court interventions to identify issues in
high-conflict cases and should refer clients to available resources and
processes to help them resolve their conflicts outside the courtroom.
f. Lawyers should assist one another and the court in expeditiously
determining the best interests of the child by cooperating in defining and
limiting the issues, procedures, and evidence necessary to determine the
best interests of the child.
g. Lawyers should maintain a civil demeanor and encourage their clients to
follow their example.
h. Lawyers and parties should not use the media, child protective services,
or other means to create or exacerbate conflict and should be sensitive to
the child's need for privacy.
i. Lawyers should be trained in child development, child abuse and neglect,
domestic violence, family dynamics, and alternative conflict resolution and
be knowledgeable about cross-disciplinary issues affecting their high-
conflict custody cases, such as competencies of other professionals and
available community resources.
Lawyers should develop and participate in special continuing legal education
programs for high-conflict custody cases and encourage law schools to
incorporate inter-disciplinary training in mental health and dispute resolution
into the family law curriculum to improve lawyers' ability to reduce conflict in
custody cases.
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Although some commentators believe that attorney profession-
alism has declihed, 145 some divorce clients favorably report that
their attorneys "interpreted" the proceeding for them, helped them
keep perspective, and provided needed emotional support.
146
Certainly, lawyers do serve to protect the interests of their clients
and may effectively provide a voice for the disempowered, particu-
larly for the abuse survivor.1 47 However, choosing and affording the
right attorney, one who screens for and understands the dynamics
of abuse, is crucial for the battered woman.
14
D. Pro Se Litigants
Although divorce clients express unhappiness with their
attorneys, being unrepresented is also problematic, especially if the
other spouse has retained an attorney. To a large extent, lawyers
control the public's access to the court system and the quality of
justice that litigants receive. 49
The number of pro se litigants in family cases has increased
dramatically in recent years. A 1990 American Bar Association
study of representation in divorce cases in Maricopa County,
Arizona found that neither party was represented in 52% of the
cases and at least one party was unrepresented in 88% of the
cases. 150 In contrast, a 1980 study found that one party lacked
representation in only 24% of the cases. 15 1 Other studies indicate
similar proportions of unrepresented parties. For example, a
California study found at least one spouse appearing pro se in 67%
of domestic relations cases and 40% of child custody cases.'52 A
national study concluded that 72% of domestic relations cases
involved at least one unrepresented party'53 and an Oregon study
145. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself" A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1344-45 (1997).
146. See Connie J.A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation
Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLT & L. 989,1014 (2000); Pruett & Jackson, supra
note 134, at 294-95.
147. Leigh Goodmark, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Potential for Gender Bias,
JUDGES' J., Spring 2000, at 21, 26.
148. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801,814 (1993).
149. KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE: THE ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY
DIVORCE LAWYERS AND JUDGES xviii (1996).
150. Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in
Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS
L.J. 105, 109 (2001).
151. Id.
152. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 993.
153. Id.
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found that in 80% of Oregon family cases at least one side was
unrepresented.'54 Therefore, there is little question that divorce
proceedings where both sides are represented by counsel are no
longer the norm; rather, they are surprisingly rare. 5
What are the consequences when a litigant is unrepresented?
A 1993 survey found that pro se litigants involved in uncontested
cases were generally satisfied (88%) with their decrees. 156 However,
when issues were contested, the satisfaction rate decreased to
33%."' Not surprisingly, pro se parties who litigated against
represented parties were less likely to say that they would repre-
sent themselves again; 36% said they would do so, while 70% of pro
se litigants who faced an unrepresented party said they would do
so again.1
5
Unrepresented parties in a divorce shoulder the burden of
navigating the legal system unsupported.5 9 The National Center
for State Courts research found that pro se family litigants
experienced the following problems: (1) 41% had difficulty locating
where and how to file; (2) 37% had trouble understanding court
procedures; (3) 31% had difficulty understanding forms, 28% had
difficulty completing forms, and 26% had difficulty obtaining forms;
(4) 19% were concerned about speaking in court; (5) 14% had
difficulty obtaining evidence to support the case; and (6) 14% had
trouble scheduling the case. 6 ° Abuse survivors must add safety
concerns to this list of issues.
Studies indicate that most people are unrepresented because
they cannot afford to hire an attorney.16 1  Women, including
battered women, are less likely to be represented than men. 16 2
Particularly in domestic violence cases, the victim is at a severe
disadvantage if the abuser is represented and she is not, because
154. OREGON TASK FORCE, supra note 128, at 5.
155. Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB.
L. 123, 131(1993).
156. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1039.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1040.
159. Id. at 1019.
160. Carol Flango et al., HOW ARE COURTS COORDINATING FAMILY CASES?, National Center
f o r S t a t e C o u r t s 4 6, a t
http'J/www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_SCtFam_CtCoordFamCasesPub.pdf.
161. Flango et al., supra note 160, at 44; Report of the Maine Commission on Gender
Justice and the Courts, 49 M. L. REV. 135, 148 (1997) [hereinafter Maine Commission].
162. Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
713, 714-17 (2000) [hereinafter Reasking]; Carol Flango et al., supra note 160, at 44; Maine
Commission, supra note 161, at 148-49.
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she is then without a spokesperson and advocate.1 63 The repre-
sented party may also have more access to financial and other case
related information. 1
Studies indicate that the presence of lawyers has an impact on
the outcome of the case as well. After controlling for gender,
Maccoby and Mnookin found that represented parents were more
likely to be awarded physical custody than unrepresented
parents. 5 In cases where neither party was represented, Maccoby
and Mnookin found that joint legal custody was awarded to half of
the families. 6 However, when both parties were represented,
couples received joint legal custody 92% of the time. 6 7
Being unrepresented in an adversarial proceeding is more than
just a disadvantage for the abuse survivor - it can be dangerous.
Given the skyrocketing number of pro se litigants, the battered
woman is increasingly likely to be representing herself.
E. Children
Even though the vast majority of custody cases do not go to
trial, commentators believe that the "adversarial mentality"
invades the attitudes of the litigating parents. 68  For example,
issues may be framed in terms of the parents' rights rather than
the child's needs 6 9 and the contestants may see each other as
opponents in a win/lose struggle rather than as parents making
plans for the future.17 As hostility increases, the parties' ability to
parent may be adversely affected.' 7'
Much has been written about the impact of adversarial divorce
on children7 2 and evidence continues to mount connecting the
intensity of parental conflict with poor post-divorce adjustment. 7 1
Even though the marital relationship ends, couples with children
163. Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40
BUFF. L. REV. 441,519-20 (1992) [hereinafter Killing Us Softly]; Goodmark, supra note 147,
at 26.
164. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1019.
165. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 110.
166. Id. at 108.
167. Id.
168. Elrod, supra note 111, at 498-99; War and PEACE, supra note 112, at 145-46.
169. Elrod, supra note 111, at 499; Weinstein, supra note 119, at 88.
170. Weinstein, supra note 119, at 132-33.
171. Elrod, supra note 111, at 501.
172. See MAVIS E. HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE
RECONSIDERED 157-58 (2002); Bahr, supra note 106, at 9-11; Ronald L. Solove, Judges on
Judging: Confessions of a Judicial Activist, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 797, 800 (1993).
173. ELLIS, supra note 22, at 184; Elrod, supra note 111, at 496-97.
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will continue to deal with each other as parents, even when there
has been domestic abuse."4 Garrity and Baris found that a quarter
of parents ease into a co-parenting relationship, half of parents
disengage for a period of time and then become more cooperative,
and the last quarter remain at odds for the duration." 5
In the adversarial model, custody decisions are based on
statutory standards such as the best interests of the child.
However, the vague "best interests" legal standard gives little
guidance to judges who are expected to label one parent as better
than the other.'76 Although appearing to.stress the child's needs,
the "indeterminacy" of the standard requires judges to make value
judgments and makes predicting outcomes problematic."' As a
result, some commentators believe that mothers are held to a
higher standard than are fathers.' Although some studies show
that mothers are the primary custodial parents in two-thirds of
custody cases,' 9 fathers increasingly are awarded custody to the
point that some researchers have reported that men are awarded
custody at least half of the time that they pursue it.'s°
There has also been a significant increase in the number of
joint legal custody decrees, which now approach 80%.8 ' Further-
more, joint physical custody is being increasingly used as a
resolution for high conflict and abusive families.' 2 This outcome is
of concern because in such families joint physical custody may work
to "cement rather than resolve" parental conflict.'83 In abusive
families, this unresolved conflict between the parents may escalate
into violence.
What about custody contests involving clear cases of domestic
violence? Some commentators feel that domestic violence survivors
are disadvantaged under the adversarial system because of the lack
174. CARLA B. GARRITY & MITCHELL A. BARIs, CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE 27 (1994).
175. Id. at 27-28.
176. Peter Carnevale et al., Contingent Mediator Behavior and Its Effectiveness, in
MEDIATION RESEARCH 263 (Kenneth Kressel et al. ed., 1989).
177. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 97 (2002).
178. Reasking, supra note 162, at 725-26.
179. MACCOBY& MNOOKIN,supra note 115, at 108; Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth,
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133,.211 (1992); Kathy T.
Graham, Child Custody in the New Millennium: ALl's Proposed Model Contrasted with
Oregon's Law, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 523,542 (1999).
180. Reasking, supra note 162, at 723.
181. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 108; Reasking, supra note 162, at 723.
182. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 159.
183. Elrod, supra note 111, at 509 (citing H. Patrick Stern et. al., Battered-Child
Syndrome: Is It a Paradigm for a Child of Embattled Divorce?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 335,379(2000)).
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of awareness about domestic violence, the failure to link battering
and parenting under the law, and the proliferation of "friendly
parent" provisions.184 Despite new research regarding the effect of
domestic violence on children, discussed in Part II, the existence of
domestic violence is not always seen as relevant to custody
decisions.'85 Studies show that abusive fathers are sometimes
awarded custody.'86 For this reason, a few states have followed the
lead of the Model Code of Family Violence and have passed statutes
creating a rebuttable presumption against the abuser's obtaining
custody of children. 187
Even when the abuse survivor is awarded sole custody,
visitation will be an issue.'88 Courts often fail to pay sufficient
attention to safety issues surrounding visitation'89 and this creates
an ongoing opportunity for the abuser to continue to manipulate the
family. 190
F. Economic Issues
Economic issues pervade the adversarial divorce process.
Research indicates that even women and children who are not
solely dependent on the other spouse for support suffer a decline in
income after separation.'91 In an effort to "unhook" the couple's
finances and make a clean break, courts sometimes fail to provide
adequately and specifically for future needs.'92 Maccoby and
Mnookin report that only 30% of mothers received a spousal
support award and that child support awards were inadequate to
prevent a precipitous decline in income for mothers and children. 9 '
In contrast, the financial situation of divorced fathers improved
184. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do
for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237,262 (1999) [hereinafter From
Property to Personhood]; Reasking, supra note 162, at 727-28.
185. DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 13; Pamela M. Macktaz,Domestic Violence:A View From
the Bench, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37,44 (1994-95); Murphy, supra note 8, at 288.
186. Becker, supra note 179, at 183 (three of nineteen fathers accused of spousal abuse
were denied sole or joint physical custody); Mahoney, supra note 30, at 45 (59% of fathers
awarded custody had physically abused wives); Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in
Custody: Disputes When One Parent Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, 1119
(1996) (larger proportion of battering fathers win custody than nonbattering fathers).
187. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (1994).
188. From Property to Personhood, supra note 184, at 271.
189. GARRITY & BARIS, supra note 174, at 20.
190. From Property to Personhood, supra note 184, at 271.
191. Reasking, supra note 162, at 713-14.
192. Id. at 719-20.
193. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 249.
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following divorce. 194 This inequity is attributed to low child support
guidelines 9 ' and nonpayment of support orders'96 rather than the
mother bargaining away support in order to secure custody.197 As
noted previously, a woman's lack of equivalent economic resources
compromises her ability to fully participate in the adversarial
process by hiring an attorney, paying for, experts, and pursuing
temporary financial and other relief.'98
G. Conclusion
The adversarial process has a long history of resolving marital
disputes. In cases of domestic abuse, however, it may not always
be appropriate. In some situations, the traditional adversarial
system may protect the interests of abuse survivors, especially if
they have access to strong representation and sufficient resources
to finance prolonged litigation. However, many serious cases fall
through the cracks in a system that is unsuited to protecting them.
Is mediation a better alternative?
V. OVERVIEW OF DIVORCE MEDIATION PROCESS
Mediation has recently come into vogue in the United States as
an alternative method of resolving disputes.' 99 However, it has a
long history, sharing much with processes dating back to ancient
China, the New Testament, and Navajo Peacemaking. 20 0
A. Definition
What is mediation? The Model Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation define it as:
A process in which a mediator, an impartial third party,
facilitates the resolution of family disputes by promoting the
participants'voluntary agreement. The family mediator assists
194. Id. at 264.
195. Reasking, supra note 162, at 721.
196. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 263.
197. Id. at 156.
198. WINNER, supra note 149, at 13; Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women's Freedom to Contract
at Divorce: A Mask of Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1175 (1999) [hereinafter
Freedom to Contract].
199. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 991.
200. Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (1999); Milne & Folberg, supra note 121, at 3-4.
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communication, encourages understanding and focuses the
participants on their individual and common interests. The
family mediator works with the participants to explore options,
make decisions and reach their own agreements.2"'
While the Model Standards suggest that family mediation does not
supplant legal advice or therapy, it can help families communicate
and determine their own outcomes. It can also promote the
interests of children while reducing the financial and emotional toll
of divorce.20 2
Although there is agreement about the general theory of
divorce mediation, in practice mediation programs are very
different from each other2 3 with respect to the scope of issues
considered, the number of sessions offered, the qualifications of the
mediator, and the involvement of lawyers. For example, lawyer
participation in mediation varies from eleven to 75% depending on
location.0 4 Thus, when people refer to mediation, it is important to
clarify who is mediating and the nature of the setting and the
process.20 5
Research shows that the success of mediation is linked to the
quality of the program and factors such as the time spent mediat-
ing, client treatment, and the degree of inconvenience clients
experience.20 6 Mediation is more likely to result in settlement and
behavioral change when the couple spends more time with an
experienced mediator who focuses on enhancing communication.2 7
Court mandated public mediation is very cost efficient but may be
less successful because it often is shorter in duration and focuses on
fewer issues.208
Although mediators work differently, the process of mediation
usually includes the following steps:
201. Andrew Schepard, An Introduction to the Model Standards ofPractice for Family and
Divorce Mediation, 35 FAM. L. Q. 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter Introduction to the Model
Standards]. The Model Standards were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on February
19, 2001.
202. Id.
203. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 995.
204. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade of
Research, in MEDIATION RESEARCH, 16 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., (1989)).
205. STEPHEN K. ERICKSON & MARILYN S. MCKNIGHT, THE PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO
MEDIATION 17-18 (2001); Jay Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, 19 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 413, 414 (1985).
206. Beck & Sales, suprd note 146, at 1032.
207. Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.
REV. 373, 380 (1996).
208. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 433.
2003]
172 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 9:145
1. Identify the issue.
2. Create an understanding of the issues. (This is accom-
plished through education and information provided by
both the mediator, the clients, and sometimes by neutral
experts.)
3. For each property issue, place an actual value on the item,
and discuss the value of each item.
4. Consider options for decision making about each issue.
5. Analyze the consequences of the options for each spouse
and for their children.
6. Discuss their standard of fairness about each issue.
7. Make a decision based on their standard of fairness.
8. Draft and review each agreement.
9. Submit their agreements for review, drafting, and imple-
mentation by their attorneys.2"
B. The Role of the Mediator
The role of the mediator is to function as a neutral facilitator
who refrains from expressing a point of view on the dispute but
instead helps the parties make their own decisions.21° This is in
contrast to the judge in an adversarial proceeding who renders final
decisions for the family.21" ' Rathqr than controlling the outcome, the
mediator structures the process by managing the flow of the
discussion and attending to power imbalances." 2
Indeed, research shows that participants are more likely to
reach agreement when the mediator actively structures the
sessions, focuses the parties on problem-solving, keeps "flexible
control," intervenes in conflict, "shapes" communication, and keeps
the parties focused on underlying interests." 3
Even though the mediator controls the process, mediation
empowers the parties to make their own substantive decisions and
209. ERICKSON & McKNIGHT, supra note 205, at 63. See also KENNETH KRESSEL & DEAN
G. PRUITT, MEDIATION RESEARCH 413 (1989); Sarah Childs Grobe, Structured Mediation and
Its Variants: What Makes It Unique, in DIVORCE MEDIATION 227 (Folberg & Milne, eds.,
1988).
210. Trina Grillo, Respecting the Struggle: Following the Parties'Lead, 13 MEDIATION Q.
279, 279 (1996).
211. In some models of mediation, the mediator is allowed or required to make
recommendations to the court. However, this practice is not consistent with the definition
of mediation used in this article. See Folberg, supra note 205, at 446; Maggie Vincent,
Mandatory Mediation of Custody Disputes: Criticism, Legislation, and Support, 20 VT. L.
REV. 255,289(1995).
212. ERICKSON & MCKNIGHT, supra note 205, at 60; JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47,
at 230.
213. Kelly, supra note 207, at 382.
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tailor their agreements to fit their unique situations.214 Because of
this individual orientation, mediated agreements tend to be more
detailed and specific.215 For example, a carefully structured
parenting plan reduces conflict by detailing transfer arrangements,
listing rules about contact, and regulating communication.2 6
Interim agreements are frequently made to stabilize the situation
without resort to formal hearings and in order to allow the couple
to "test drive" potentially permanent arrangements." 7 Throughout
this process, the mediator models problem-solving approaches and
teaches basic conflict resolution skills.21 8 As the parties arrive at
small agreements, they become more hopeful and more confident
about tackling the tougher issues.219
C. Interest-Based Process
The mediator keeps the focus on the underlying needs and
interests of the parties and their children, thus avoiding a win/lose
rights-based orientation in which parties become locked into a fixed
position.22 ° The discussion centers on brainstorming ways to fulfill
expressed needs rather than compromising in a zero sum game.221
Most couples have some common interests, especially around the
welfare of children, and the mediator attempts to build on these.222
The children's needs are a specific focus of discussion and the
mediator repeatedly draws the couple's attention to the children's
point of view.223
214. NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 22
(1989); Joanne Fuller & Rose Mary Lyons, Mediation Guidelines, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 905,
910(1997).
215. Ezzell, supra note 131, at 128.
216. Elrod, supra note 111, at 529-30.
217. Fuller & Lyons, supra note 214, at 906.
218. Wingspread, supra note 144, at 147; Ezzell, supra note 131, at 127.
219. ANTHONY J. SALIUS & SALLY DIXON MARUZO, Mediation of Child-Custody and
Visitation Disputes in a Court Setting, in DIVORCE MEDIATION 189 (Folberg & Milne eds.,
1988); Ezzell, supra note 131, at 127.
220. ERICKSON & MCKNIGHT, supra note 205, at 46.
221. Id. at 49; MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 52.
222. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 53.
223. GROBE, supra note 209, at 188-89; Elrod, supra note 111, at 529; Ezzell, supra note
131, at 129; Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 43, 50-51 (1995).
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D. Standard of Fairness
Because mediation helps couples build agreements unique to
them, they are able to use their own standards of fairness22 4 subject
to the advice of their attorneys and subsequent approval by the
court.225 They have the freedom to address emotional issues in a
constructive setting,226 set their own time frame,2 2 7 and control
costs.
2 2 8
E. Time
Research indicates that mediated divorce cases generally
proceed more quickly than those that are not mediated.229 Some
researchers have found that a mediated divorce is completed in half
the time it would normally take the case to make its way through
the court system.230 However, as noted previously, the amount of
time saved depends upon the process used, with private mediation
taking longer than public mediation.231 While successful mediation
saves time, unsuccessfully mediated cases actually take longer to
complete than those continuously within the adversarial system.232
F. Cost
Most studies have also found that mediation is less expensive
than the traditional court process.233 In one study, mediating
couples saved 134% in fees when compared to those using the two
224. ERICKSON & MCKNIGHT, supra note 205, at 50; Folberg, supra note 205, at 419.
225. But see Reclaiming Professionalism, supra note 2 (asserting that judicial oversight
does not prevent unfair agreements).
226. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 214, at 21; Gerenceser, supra note 223, at 50; Milne
& Folberg, supra note 121, at 3.
227. Stephen K. Erickson, The Legal Dimension of Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION 122 (Folberg & Milne eds., 1988); Ezzell, supra note 131, at 128; Fuller & Lyons,
supra note 214, at 906.
228. Erickson, supra note 227, at 123; Fuller & Lyons, supra note 214, at 910; Mackoffet
al., supra note 29, at 1317; Kate McCabe, A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation Through
a Feminist Jurisprudential Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 459,461 (2001).
229. KRESSEL & PRUITT, supra note 209, at 398; Folberg, supra note 205, at 431; King,
supra note 113, at 429. But see NAT'L CENTERFORSTATE COURTS, MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT
OF DIVORCE MEDIATION AND TRADITIONAL COURT PROCESSING 71(1992) [hereinafter MULTI-
STATE ASSESSMENT] (describing the time savings as nominal).
230. Kelly, supra note 207, at 376; The Evolving Judicial Role, supra note 20, at 411.
231. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 432 (2.4 hours difference).
232. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, 4 FAM. ADVOC.
26,29(1982).
233. KRESSEL & PRUITT, supra note 209, at 398; Kelly, supra note 207, at 376; King, supra
note 113, at 439. But see MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT supra note 229, at 71.
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attorney adversarial process.2 34 In another study, couples saved
42% in attorney fees. Couples also save money by using single
neutral experts, as needed, rather than hiring "battling" experts.235
The amount saved depends on the mediation process used, with
more savings being accrued if the case is diverted from the courts
early in the process.3 6 Mandatory mediation is particularly cost
efficient.237
G. Settlement Rates
Mediation settlement rates vary by program but range from
forty to 80% with the average rate of settlement being about 60%.238
Some research has shown that high conflict levels do not correlate
with lower settlement rates in mediation.239 However, other
researchers have found that mediation is more problematic when
the conflict is intense, the power differential is significant, the
parties are not highly motivated to settle, the parties disagree in
principle, and they are negotiating over "scarce resources."24 °
H. Satisfaction Levels
Studies indicate that satisfaction levels with mediation range
from 60% to 93% .241 Both men and women are equally satisfied
with mediation, with 78% of men and 72% of women reporting that
they are somewhat to very satisfied.242 Satisfaction rates vary
depending upon whether the parties reach agreement. Those who
settle are more satisfied than those who do not settle.24 3 Interest-
234. Joan B. Kelly, Is Mediation Less Expensive?, 8 MEDIATION Q. 15, 15 (1990).
235. See ERICKSON & McKNIGHT, supra note 205, at 100.
236. See Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1041.
237. MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT supra note 229 at 71.
238. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 103. See also KRESSEL & PRUITT, supra note
209, at 397 (60%); Jeanne A. Clement & Andrew I. Schwebel, A Research Agenda for Divorce
Mediation: The Creation of Second Order Knowledge to Inform Legal Policy, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 95,99 (1993) (45% to 75%); Folberg, supra note 205, at 422 (58%); Introduction
to the Model Standards, supra note 201, at 3 (50% to 60%); Kelly & Gigy, supra note 21, at
18.
239. Kelly, supra note 207, at 380.
240. See KRESSEL & PRUITT, supra note 209, at 405. See also Milne & Folberg, supra note
121, at 16.
241. ELLIS, supra note 22 at 74; Folberg, supra note 205, at 424. See also KRESSEL &
PRUITr, supra note 209, at 395 (75%); Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238, at 98 (80% to
100%).
242. Kelly & Gigy, supra note 21, at 278.
243. ELLIS, supra note 22 at 74.
20031
176 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 9:145
ingly, even among those who do not reach agreement, 81% would
nevertheless recommend the process to a friend.244
Mediating couples report liking the focus on the children, the
chance to air grievances, the opportunity to discuss real issues, the
ability to keep the discussion on track.245 Those expressing
dissatisfaction with mediation describe the process as tense,
unpleasant, confusing, and rushed.
2 46
Research shows that both men and women are more satisfied
with mediation than with the adversarial process.241 Seventy-seven
percent of mediating couples are pleased with the mediation
process, but only 40% of litigating couples are satisfied with the
court procedure.248 In fact, 50% to 70% of those litigating express
active dissatisfaction with the legal system. 49 Reasons for this
dissatisfaction include the reluctance to deal with private matters
in public, the impersonality of the process, and the association of
court appearances with criminal prosecution. 2" Eighty-five percent
of mediating couples see the process as fair compared to 20% to 30%
of those using the court system.25' Mediation is seen as involving
less pressure, protecting people's rights better, giving couples more
control over decisions, and being less coercive. 2  Dissatisfaction
rates increase as couples become more involved with lawyers and
the court system.253
I. Compliance and Relitigation
Mediators have long believed that compliance with mediated
agreements is higher because the parties have thoroughly explored
alternatives and voluntarily chosen to take the agreed upon path.254
Indeed, research shows that mediating couples are more likely to
244. Id.
245. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 19, 438.
246. Id. at 439.
247. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 102 (detailing positive results of mediation);
Kelly & Gigy, supra note 21, at 280.
248. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 437.
249. Id. at 437-38.
250. Id.
251. Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238, at 99; Folberg, supra note 205, at 424.
252. MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 229, at 72.
253. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 104.
254. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 281; McCabe, supra note 228, at 460-61. See MARY
R. CATHCART & ROBERTE. ROBLES, U.S. COMM'N ON CHILD & FAM. WELFARE, PARENTINGOUR
CHILDREN: IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE NATION 21 (1996).
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comply with the agreements they have made.255 This is especially
true for custody and child support agreements." 6 Couples partici-
pating in multiple mediation sessions over a two to three month
period have higher compliance rates than those participating in a
single mediation session.257
Some studies also show that relitigation rates are lower for
mediating couples.25 Other researchers have found that mediating
couples are less likely to return to court for the first two years after
the divorce but that relitigation rates even out by the five-year
point.259 Although these results are somewhat inconclusive, there
is no indication that mediation increases relitigation rates.26°
J. Who Chooses to Mediate?
Not everyone chooses to mediate and researchers have
compared the characteristics of couples who mediate with those of
couples using the adversary process. People choosing to mediate are
generally better educated and have higher incomes than those who
do not mediate.26' Those choosing to use the court system are apt
to have been separated longer and are more likely to have been
abused.262 There is little difference between the two groups with
respect to the ongoing level of conflict evidenced prior to entering
mediation. 263 Thus, high conflict couples are as likely to mediate
as lower conflict couples. Research shows that couples choose
mediation for practical reasons, usually financial, and because they
want to keep their relationship as friendly as possible.264 A
substantial number (80%) of those choosing mediation do so to
avoid contact with attorneys and court proceedings as well as to
reduce costs.
26 5
255. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 116; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at
21.
256. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 116; Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238, at
100.
257. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 116.
258. ELLIS, supra note 22, at 75; Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238, at 100 (1993)
(stating that mediation reduces post-settlement relitigation up to 30%); Folberg, supra note
205, at 425.
259. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 115-16; King, supra note 113, at 435.
260. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 21-22.
261. ELLIS, supra note 22 at 73.
262. See ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 27 (concluding that people who choose
lawyers also are often poorer and less educated).
263. Kelly & Gigy, supra note 21, at 267.
264. Id. at 271.
265. KRESSEL & PRUIT, supra note 209, at 410.
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K Children and Custody
The focus on the needs of the children is a hallmark of the
mediation process as described in Standard VIII of the Model
Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation:
A family mediator shall assist participants in determining how
to promote the best interests of children.
A. The mediator should encourage the participants to explore
the range of options available for separation or post divorce
parenting arrangements and their respective costs and
benefits. Referral to a specialist in child development may
be appropriate for these purposes. The topics for discus-
sion may include, among others:
1. information about community resources and programs
that can help the participants and their children cope
with the consequences of family reorganization and
family violence;
2. problems that continuing conflict creates for children's
development and what steps might be taken to
ameliorate the effects of conflict on the children;
3. development of a parenting plan that covers the
children's physical residence and decision-making
responsibilities for the children, with appropriate
levels of detail as agreed to by the participants;
4. the possible need to revise parenting plans as the
developmental needs of the children evolve over time;
and
5. encouragement to the participants to develop appro-
priate dispute resolution mechanisms to facilitate
future revisions of the parenting plan.2"
Thus, mediated agreements usually include longer and more
detailed parenting agreements.
Several studies show that mediating couples are more likely to
agree to joint custody,267 while mothers are more likely to be
awarded sole custody in the courts.26 Other researchers believe
that there is no significant difference in custody outcomes.269
266. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard VIII.
267. KRESSEL & PRUITT, supra note 209, at 397; Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238, at
101 (50% to 60% joint).
268. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 138; Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238, at
104.
269. MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 229, at 38-39; Vincent, supra note 211, at 275-
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Aside from the outcome, the divorce process used by the
parents has less effect on the adjustment of children than does their
ongoing conflict level and the passage of time. ° Mediation may
reduce parental conflict levels for the first couple of years,2 7' but
this does not appear to be a long term effect.2 72  Although the
mediation process is too brief to reverse entrenched behavior
patterns, parental cooperation is positively associated with the
amount of time spent in mediation.2 71 Parents whose cooperation
level was increased through participation in mediation found that
they communicated more effectively, understood each other's point
of view better, and reduced their anger levels.2 74 Although 15% to
20% of mediating couples reported that their relationship worsened
in mediation, nearly half of the litigating couples believed that that
adversarial process had harmed their relationship.2 75 The media-
tion process, therefore, is seen as less potentially damaging to
parental cooperation than are court proceedings.276
L. Economic Issues
Although there is some evidence that couples who mediate
perceive their property settlements to be fairer than those who
litigate27 7 and some believe that women and children are economi-
cally advantaged in mediation, 271 research shows that the choice of
divorce process is not a highly significant economic factor.279
Rather, the couple's financial status prior to the divorce and
whether either has remarried is more predictive of financial status
after divorce.280 Because males are generally better off financially,
they tend to remain so after divorce in mediation as well as under
the adversarial model.28 '
270. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 137-38.
271. Id.; ROGERS & McEWEN,supra note 214, at 110; Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238,
at 100-01.
272. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 138; Kelly, supra note 207, at 379.
273. Kelly, supra note 207, at 379.
274. Clement & Schwebel, supra note 238, at 100-01.
275. Id.
276. See Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation:An Overview of Research
Results, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451,471-72 (1985).
277. Kelly, supra note 207, at 379.
278. SARAH R. COLE et al., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 12.2 (2d ed. 1994). See
ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 88 (citing a study in which mothers who participated
in mediation were awarded, more often, the child support they wanted than those who
received a negotiated settlement).
279. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 138.
280. Id. at 123, 138.
281. See id. at 123.
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M. Gender
Because the adversary system sometimes has failed to protect
the interests of women and battered women in particular," 2 some
believe that mediation embodies a style of conflict resolution that
is more compatible with women's world view and "ethic of care."283
Others have expressed grave concern about the use of mediation in
divorce cases generally and most especially in cases where there is
a history of domestic violence. These concerns are explored in the
next section.
VI. DIVORCE MEDIATION WHEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS AN ISSUE
Although mediation provides a desirable alternative for many
families, there are serious concerns about its use in cases of
domestic violence. Some of these concerns arise from the mediation
process itself and others stem from the varying quality of the
conducted mediation.8 4
A. Reasons Why Mediation Might Never Be Appropriate
1. Is Mediation Too Private?
Privacy and confidentiality are critical aspects of the mediation
process. Both are necessary to encourage full disclosure and candid
problem solving.2"5 Some women's advocates, however, are troubled
by the private nature of mediation. After years of working to have
domestic violence dealt with as a crime, they see mediation as
potentially returning the issue "back into the shadows."286 Because
282. See Vincent, supra note 211, at 282.
283. See McCabe, supra note 228, at 471-72 (discussing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 24-63 (1993)); Vincent, supra
note 211, at 257-58 (citing Nancy G. Maxwell, The Feminist Dilemma in Mediation, in
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY, 4 FAMILY LAW AND GENDER BIAS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 67-68 (Nicholas Mercuro & Barbara Stark, eds., 1992)).
284. Stephen K. Erickson & Marilyn S. McKnight, Mediating Spousal Abuse Divorces, 7
MEDIATION Q. 377, 379 (1990) (emphasizing that mediators must have "special skills ...
tailored to the complex dynamic of spousal abuse." The role of the mediator is to help set
"new rules" to eliminate spousal abuse.).
285. Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harm's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney
Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 730 (1993).
286. Goodmark, supra note 147, at 24; Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 235, 240-41 (2002). See also WINNER,
supra note 149, at 182-84 (discussing the imbalance of power in divorce mediation).
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criminal prosecution sends a public message to the abuser that his
behavior is unacceptable, advocates fear that the abusers in
mediation will not be held accountable for the abuse.28 Similarly,
they fear that if these cases are removed from the courts, new
favorable legal precedents will not be established.288
Two factors mitigate these concerns. First, divorce mediation
need not supplant the use of the criminal system.8 9 If an abuse
survivor chooses to do so, she can file criminal charges, pursue a
protective order, and mediate the divorce. Use of the criminal
courts is not an exclusive remedy. Second, a growing body of
evidence suggests that applying criminal sanctions may not deter
further abuse. Rather, in some cases, criminal charges have been
correlated with an increased likelihood of a recurrence of abuse.29 °
Consequently, each victim must make an individual assessment of
whether the abuser will be deterred from further violence by
criminal prosecution. Either way, she could proceed with media-
tion.
Proponents of mediation argue that the privacy of the process
and the neutrality of the mediator increase the likelihood that the
abuser will admit the abuse and accept help.29'
The adversarial approach to spousal abuse often actually
encourages the husband to deny his past abusive behavior
because his defense attorney will assist him in denying the
offense .... In mediation, the mediator and the couple can
immediately deal with the abuse because the neutral role of the
mediator takes away the need for the mediator to be a judge
determiningwhat happened in the past and allows the mediator
to focus on steps to remove any possibility of future allegations
or occurrences of abuse.292
Some batterers may respond more constructively if they perceive
that they are being listened to, treated fairly, and given clear
287. Kerry Loomis, Comment, Domestic Violence and Mediation: A Tragic Combination
for Victims in California Family Court, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 355,367 (1999).
288. Goodmark, supra note 147, at 24; Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's
Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431,431 (1985).
289. See Ann W. Yellott, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Call for Collaboration, 8
MEDIATION Q. 39,39-42 (1990).
290. See Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic
Violence?, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 49 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
Buzawa eds., 1996).
291. Luisa Bigornia, Alternatives to Traditional Criminal Prosecution of Spousal Abuse,
11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 57, 60-61 (2000); Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 102; Yellott,
supra note 289, at 43.
292. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 284, at 385.
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expectations for future behavior.29 This does not mean that abuse
should ever be tolerated or negotiated.294
Although more research is needed in this area, there is some
evidence that mediation prevents future violence.295 Researchers
Ellis and Stuckless report that voluntary multi-session mediation
is more effective in preventing future violence than either coerced
mediation or lawyer negotiations. 96 Interestingly, they found that
the preparation of affidavits with "hurtful" content may have
undermined lawyers' efforts to end the abuse.2 97
Some mediators specifically recommend that a protective order
be pursued simultaneously with mediation and that the mediation
sessions be used to reinforce the boundaries set in the order.298
Until more is known about which abusers are likely to offend
again and under what circumstances, the abuse survivor ought to
have an expanded, not more limited, array of options including both
civil and criminal sanctions.
2. Are Power Imbalances Insurmountable?
The potential difference in power between the victim and the
abuser is a major concern when mediation is being considered or
conducted.2 99
293. MARILYN McKNIGHT, MEDIATING IN THE SHADOW OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 50 (1997);
Holly A. Magana & Nancy Taylor, Child Custody Mediation and Spouse Abuse: A Descriptive
Study of Protocol, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 50, 54 (1993). But see Reclaiming
Professionalism, supra note 2, at 205 (asserting that in cases of domestic abuse, "mediation
is a power choice").
294. Mary A. Duryee, Guidelines for Family Court Services Intervention When There Are
Allegations of Domestic Violence, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 79,82 (1995).
295. Kelly, supra note 207, at 381; Linda Perry, Mediation and Wife Abuse: A Review of
the Literature, 11 MEDIATION Q. 313, 322 (1994); Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 103. See
ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 61; Kelly Rowe, Comment, The Limits of the
Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34
EMORY L.J. 855, 883-84 (1985) (citing a study in which 70% of those contacted reported no
further problems).
296. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 61-62.
297. Id. at 62; Jessica Pearson, Mediating When Domestic Violence Is a Factor: Policies
and Practices in Court-Based Divorce Mediation Programs, 14 MEDIATION Q. 319,329 (1997)
(noting that the court system is often counterproductive because couples have to deal with
each other after "trashing" each other in pleadings).
298. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 284, at 386.
299. Telser, supra note 142, at 973.
YES, NO, AND MAYBE
a. The Issue of Power Imbalance in Nonviolent Relationships
Power involves the potential for one party to impose his or her
will upon the other party.00 Power can shift and change and is not
an all or nothing attribute.0 1 It can spring from different capacities
such as one's belief system, personality, self-esteem, gender,
selfishness, force, income/assets, knowledge, status, age, and
education.3" 2 In divorce, power generally corresponds with who
originated the divorce, who has the more favorable legal case, who
feels more guilty, and who has the stronger lawyer or support
system.30 3 Power need not be entirely competitive in nature; rather,
in a cooperative relationship, each party benefits from enhancing
each other's power.
30 4
Power imbalances occur to some extent in all divorce mediation,
even when violence is not a factor."0 5 Despite the fears of commen-
tators, research shows that women do not necessarily wield less
power in the mediation process.30 6
Women often find mediation to be empowering. They report
that participation in mediation enhances their ability to stand up
for themselves, assume responsibility for themselves,0 7 solve
problems,308 and express their views.30 9 Most women studied prefer
mediation310 and their satisfaction levels are not associated with
power related marital issues such as abuse, who won arguments, or
difficulty being heard.3
Of course, some women do report being pressured into agree-
ments by their husbands, being uncomfortable with expressing
300. Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce
Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553,574 (1995) (citing MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 323 (1954)).
301. Diane Neumann, How Mediation Can Effectively Address the Male-Female Power
Imbalance in Divorce, 9 MEDIATION Q. 227, 229 (1992).
302. Id. at 229.
303. Id. at 236-37.
304. STEPHEN K. ERICKSON & MARILYN S. MCKNIGHT, POWER IMBALANCE IN MEDIATION:
SHOWSTOPPER OR OPPORTUNITY 5 (1998) [hereinafter POWER IMBALANCE].
305. Id. at 2. See ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 5-6.
306. See MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 229, at 30; Kelly, supra note 207, at 378.
See also McCabe, supra note 228, at 480 ("[Mediation offers women an opportunity to step
out of their socialized image and speak for themselves.").
307. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1037; Kelly, supra note 207, at 378.
308. Vincent, supra note 211, at 278. See Roselle Wissler, Study Suggests Domestic
Violence Does Not Affect Settlement, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 29.
309. King, supra note 113, at 444; Wissler, supra note 308, at 29.
310. MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 229, at 30; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note
204, at 440-41.
311. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1037.
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their feelings, and feeling tense, angry, confused, and overwhelmed
during the mediation process.312 Research has shown that these
women tend to terminate the mediation rather than submit to
agreements they deem unfair.313
Feeling pressure to settle has been more strongly associated
with poor communication throughout the marriage than the
presence of domestic violence.314 However, even though abuse is "an
unreliable indicator" of power imbalance," 5 there may still be an
association and this is cause for concern.316
b. The Problem of Power Imbalance in Cases of Domestic
Violence
In cases where domestic violence has taken place, there has
already been a severe abuse of power and the consequent power
imbalance can make mediation impossible. 31 '7 Barbara Hart argues
that cooperation between spouses when domestic abuse had
occurred is "an oxymoron.""' Others agree that especially where
there has been a culture of battering coupled with severe abuse, the
power imbalance is too great to be overcome in mediation." 9
Victims may fear retaliatory violence if they disagree with the
abuser, 32 ° thus making negotiation impossible. 321 This is described
by Leigh Goodmark:
Memories of the batterer's power, and the way he used that
power, trigger fear of the abuser. As one abused women noted,
"When he had power over me, he didn't have to exert himself.
312. Joan B. Kelly et al., Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Initial Findings from a
Longitudinal Study, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORYAND PRACTICE 469 (Jay Folberg & Ann
Milne eds., 1988); Kelly & Gigy, supra note 21, at 279; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204,
at 440-41.
313. David B. Chandler, Violence, Fear, and Communication: The Variable Impact of
Domestic Violence on Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 331,343-44 (1990).
314. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1037; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 440;
Vincent, supra note 211, at 277.
315. Pearson, supra note 297, at 324.
316. Vincent, supra note 211, at 278-79.
317. Reclaiming Professionalism, supra note 2, at 203; James Martin Truss, The
Subjection of Women ... Still: Unfulfilled Promise of Protection for Women Victims of
Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 1149, 1186 (1995).
318. Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women
and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317,320 (1990).
319. Reclaiming Professionalism, supra note 2, at 203-04.
320. Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, in DO ARRESTS AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, 98-99 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
321. Holly Joyce, Comment, Mediation and Domestic Violence: Legislative Responses, 14
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 447,453 (1997).
YES, NO, AND MAYBE
The more powerful I become [in getting away from him], the
more irrational he becomes. I wonder, would he hurt me
physically?" These memories may render the victim inarticu-
late or angry, making it difficult for her to express her position
during mediation. The victim may feel pressure to settle or to
compromise, continuing to believe that the abuse... will stop
if she simply decreases her demands.322
Research does bear out some of these concerns. A 1995 study
found that abused women perceive themselves as having less power
than women who have not been abused; they were more likely to
think that the abuser could "out-talk" them, had "gotten back at
them" previously, and said they were afraid to "openly disagree" for
fear of retaliation.323 Interestingly, the authors also made some
contrary discoveries as well.
However, there were no significant differences for abused and
nonabused women on four personal empowerment items: (a)
giving in just to stop dealing with the abuser, (b) feeling guilty
for asking for the custody and visitation that they wanted, (c)
perceived ability to speak up for themselves about custody and
visitation wishes, and (d) getting what they wanted in disagree-
ments.3 2 4
Other studies report that abuse survivors are able to negotiate
effectively325 and are not at a disadvantage in mediation because of
power imbalances.326 These favorable findings may be related to
the mediator screening for abuse and carefully monitoring relative
power levels.327
Despite the contrary indications found in the research, power
imbalance is an important consideration in deciding whether
mediation is appropriate. The extent of the problem varies with the
individual couple.32 8  As discussed previously, women who are
dealing with ongoing and episodic male battering or psychotic and
paranoid reactions as defined by Johnston and Campbell, may have
322. Goodmark, supra note 147, at 22.
323. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 13; Lisa Newmark et al., Domestic Violence and
Empowerment in Custody and Visitation Cases, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 30, 57
(1995).
324. Newmark et al., supra note 323, at 57. See generally MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT,
supra note 229.
325. Wissler, supra note 308, at 29.
326. Pearson, supra note 297, at 327.
327. ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 72, at 80.
328. Joyce, supra note 321, at 457.
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more difficulty mediating.329 Similarly, women suffering from
"battered women's syndrome" or PTSD may have difficulty standing
up for themselves. However, some abuse survivors are able to state
their own needs and problem solve effectively.33 °
At the other extreme, some have argued that men are disad-
vantaged in mediation because of women's greater power with
respect to children, their relationship-oriented negotiation style,
and sometimes their ability to "tell a better story."
33 1
Each couple differs with respect to power imbalance and
relative power levels may change throughout the relationship. The
power imbalance inherent in domestic violence will render some
abuse survivors unable to mediate. However, this assumption
cannot be made for all couples who have had violent incidents.
Capacity to mediate can only be assessed on an individual level.
However, if the couple and the mediator proceed with the media-
tion, the mediator needs to remain especially alert for power
imbalances and be prepared to deal with them. In addition to
viewing each couple as unique when deciding whether the media-
tion process is appropriate, it is important to ask, as Folberg and
Milne do, "Compared to what?""-
c. Dealing with Power Imbalances
In some cases, the power imbalance is too severe for mediation
to take place. However, in less extreme cases, skilled mediators are
equipped to deal with moderate power differentials.333 One way
that mediators deal with power imbalance is through their own
exercise of power. 3 4 The mediator controls the process by:
1. Creating the ground rules.
2. Choosing the topic.
3. Deciding who may speak.
4. Controlling the length of time each person may speak.
329. JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 47, at 42.
330. McCabe, supra note 228, at 476-77.
331. MACOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 115, at 95-96; Randy Frances Kandel, Power Plays:
A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child Custody Mediation and a Hearsay Analog
Solution, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 879,896 (1994); Lenard Marlow, Samson and Delilah in Divorce
Mediation, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 224,224 (2000); McCabe, supra note 228, at
477; Vincent, supra note 211, at 278.
332. MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE LEGAL
BATTLE, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 154 (1999); Grobe, supra note 209, at 17.
333. Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 101 (arguing that a skilled mediator can overcome
difficulties that arise from power imbalances).
334. Grobe, supra note 209, at 198.
YES, NO, AND MAYBE
5. Allowing and timing the person's response.
6. Determining which spouse may present a proposal to the
other.
7. Presenting an interpretation of what the spouse said.
8. Ending the discussion.
9. Writing down the agreement.3 5
The mediator gradually transfers power from himself or herself to
the divorcing couple as they become able to use it appropriately.3 3 6
If the mediator retains too much power the couple will not "own"
the agreement, but if the mediator relinquishes power prematurely,
sessions are unproductive and, in the case of domestic violence,
potentially dangerous.337 Because knowledge is a form of power,
special care is taken to share information and verify facts.338 Power
can also be balanced in a neutral fashion by asking probing
questions 3 9 and validating the concerns of the less powerful
party.34 Separate caucuses give the mediator a chance to obtain
direct feedback on power and safety issues.34'
Mediators watch for specific behaviors that indicate power
imbalances. These include but are not limited to tone of voice,
glaring, insults, passivity, threats, outbursts, and refusal to
speak.342 In addition to behavioral cues, mediators watch for
lopsided agreements. "Even if we concede that a mediator will not
be able to see how the husband is maneuvering his wife to where he
wants to get her, it is simply impossible for the mediator not to see
where her husband has brought her."343
Additional safeguards in such situations include independent
legal advice and, to some extent, judicial review.344 If necessary, the
mediator can end the mediation "on behalf of the less empowered
person.345
Some have argued that mediators cannot deal with power
imbalance without jeopardizing their neutrality and impartiality.3 41
335. Neumann, supra note 301, at 232.
336. Grobe, supra note 209, at 198.
337. Id. at 199.
338. Albie M. Davis & Richard A. Salem, Dealing with Power Imbalances in the Mediation
of Interpersonal Disputes, 6 MEDIATION Q. 17, 20 (1984).
339. Folberg, supra note 205, at 439.
340. Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 467,497-98 (1991).
341. Hughes, supra note 300, at 580; Loomis, supra note 287, at 365.
342. POWER IMBALANCE, supra note 304, at 8-9.
343. Marlow, supra note 331, at 233 n.15.
344. Milne & Folberg, supra note 121, at 20.
345. Pearson, supra note 297, at 327.
346. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1001-02; Killing Us Softly, supra note 163, at 504;
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Mediators do remain neutral with respect to the outcome of the
mediation3 47 but they are not "value-free" with respect to the
process and the safety of the participants.3 4' For example, as a part
of the process of balancing power, mediators ask probing questions
and suggest that legal counsel be sought to ensure that the parties
are equally informed and fully understand the implications of
agreements being considered.349 The alternative to ignoring power
imbalances would essentially amount to siding with the more
powerful party. Obviously, the experience of the mediator is key.
3. Do Mediators Know What They Are Doing?
As the foregoing discussion suggests, mediation is a complex
undertaking. The skill, training, and experience of the mediator
are significant variables in the quality of any mediation process.35 °
However, abuse survivors should be especially careful when
selecting a mediator because of the danger inherent in their
situation.
Because mediation is a relatively new field and much of it
operates privately and informally, regulation and quality control
have been controversial.351 Questions abound with respect to
licensure and minimum competency.352 The situation is compli-
cated by the fact that mediation is a multidisciplinary practice. For
example, a 1983 study found that while 80% of mediators held
graduate degrees, private sector mediators were likely to be social
workers (42%); therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists (36%); and
attorneys (15%). 311 The challenge comes in finding a way to
promote professional diversity and innovation while maintaining
quality control.35 4 One possible solution involves requiring perfor-
Loomis, supra note 287, at 362-63. See MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND
DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard IV; UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 9(g). Under both the Model
Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation and the Uniform Mediation Act, the
mediator has a clear duty to be impartial and to disclose any conflict of interest.
347. Introduction to the Model Standards, supra note 201, at 20.
348. Id.; Vincent, supra note 211, at 286-87. See Allan Edward Barsky, Issues in the
Termination of Mediation Due to Abuse, 13 MEDIATION Q. 19,26 (1995).
349. Barsky, supra note 348, at 96-97.
350. Treuthart, supra note 285, at 728, 755 (suggesting a mediator can never be skilled
enough to counter a batterer's control).
351. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1009.
352. Milne & Folberg, supra note 121, at 21.
353. Id. at 3, 11. See also ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 214, at 204.
354. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 214, at 184 (noting that quality control is particularly
important in cases where mediation is mandatory or the parties are unrepresented);
Stephanie A. Henning, A Framework for Developing Mediator Certification Programs, 4
HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 189,228-29 (1999).
YES, NO, AND MAYBE
mance and skills testing rather than limiting mediation practice to
a particular professional discipline.355
The Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce
Mediation suggest that mediators should:
1. have knowledge of family law;
2. have knowledge of and training in the impact of family
conflict on parents, children, and other participants,
including knowledge of child development, domestic abuse,
and child abuse and neglect;
3. have education and training specific to the process of
mediation; and
4. be able to recognize the impact of culture and diversity. 356
Mediators are expected to provide information to clients about their
training, education, and expertise.357 Mediators are cautioned not
to undertake domestic abuse cases without "appropriate and
adequate" training.358 However, this language is very general and
fails to specify anything about the desired training. Similarly, the
American Law Institute requires that mediators be qualified to
identify abuse.359
Despite the lack of agreement about the qualifications and
regulation of mediators, the research shows that participants
generally find mediators to be impartial, sensitive, and skilled.36 °
Reviews of transcripts of mediation sessions show that 80% of
mediator statements are neutral or positive in tone.36' However, in
a mandatory mediation setting study, 15% of men and women did
report that the mediator imposed his or her own viewpoint upon the
parties.362
Abuse survivors need to exercise special care in selecting a
mediator because in some states, no training or credentials are
required for mediators.363 In fact, only 70% of mediation programs
surveyed report that mediators regularly attend domestic violence
355. Henning, supra note 354, at 228.
356. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARD,
Standard X (2001).
357. Id. at Standard II(B).
358. Id. at Standard X(B).
359. Reihling, supra note 122, at 401. See also Margaret Shaw et al., National Standards
for Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 156,184 (1993).
360. Kelly, supra note 207, at 378.
361. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 16.
362. Kelly, supra note 207, at 378.
363. Beck & Sales, supra note 146, at 1011; Telser, supra note 142, at 974; Tondo et al.,
supra note 2, app. at 445 (2001) (listing state by state comparison).
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training programs.364 Families who have experienced domestic
violence should only consider mediating with someone who has
specialized domestic violence training and experience."' Mediators
should only undertake such cases if they are trained to understand
the dynamics of domestic violence and have been taught special
techniques for working with abusive families such as power
balancing, screening, special safeguards, safety planning, and
community referrals.366 This training should be followed up with
experiential requirements including the co-mediation of cases and
a lengthy period of case supervision.3"7
B. Deciding Whether to Mediate
If power imbalances are manageable and a qualified mediator
is available, mediation may be worth exploring. Research indicates
that the settlement rates in domestic abuse divorce cases are
comparable to other mediated divorces. 8 These settlement rates
range from 51% to 76%.369 Violent and nonviolent couples express
equal levels of satisfaction with the mediation process, the agree-
ments made, and the level of compliance with agreements.37 ° In one
study, 80% of complainants and respondents reported satisfaction
with the process. Other studies have found that women experience
higher levels of satisfaction and that couples perceive that their
dealings with each other are improved.37' This is probably because
mediated agreements tend to be more detailed with respect to
structuring future contact.372
1. Is It a Choice? Mandating Mediation
A central tenet of mediation theory is that mediation should be
a voluntary choice.373 Consequently, many mediators find the
364. Pearson, supra note 297, at 332; Nancy Thoennes et al., Mediation and Domestic
Violence Current Policies and Practices, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 6, 10 (1995).
365. ELLIS, supra note 22 at 332; Carnevale et al. supra, note 176, at 229; Fischer et al.,
supra note 42, at 2143; Treuthart, supra note 285, at 755.
366. Alexandria Zylstra, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Practical Screening Method
for Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 253, 270 (2001).
See Yellott, supra note 289, at 47 (listing suggested topics for training).
367. Zylstra, supra note 366, at 270.
368. Chandler, supra note 313, at 341.
369. Magana & Taylor, supra note 293, at 60; Perry, supra note 295, at 321,323.
370. Fischer et al., supra note 42, at 2152.
371. Wissler, supra note 308, at 29.
372. Chandler, supra note 313, at 344.
373. Milne & Folberg, supra note 121, at 19.
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notion of mandatory mediation to be "a contradiction in terms"374
because mediation is about self-determination, not coercion.375
Both the Model Code and the Model Family Standards
contemplate voluntary participation in mediation.376 Section 407 of
the Model Code provides that mediation in the context of domestic
violence should only take place if requested by the victim.377 The
Model Family Mediation Standards embrace the concept of
"informed consent"3 78 and call for informational sessions to discuss
the process of mediation, the need for independent legal advice,
confidentiality, and related issues.379 Ideally, the mediator should
meet separately with each party to screen for abuse and discuss
safety options.
Advocates object to mandatory mediation fearing that victims
will feel pressured into participating, even if they can opt out;
individual mediators will vary regarding the stringency of screening
and extent of safety measures; and the process will be too oriented
toward cooperation, good faith bargaining, and compromise. 380 So
far, these fears have not been born out by the research. Those
required to attend mediation express equal or higher levels of
satisfaction (70% to 90%)381 than their voluntary counterparts. 38 2
When asked, 85% to 91% respond affirmatively to the idea of
requiring all divorcing couples to participate in mediation.3 3
There is some evidence that court mandated mediation, while
shorter and more cost efficient, is not as effective as private
mediation.38 4 On the other hand, research shows that mandatory
programs provide more domestic violence training for mediators
and require more thorough screening than private programs.3 5
Those who favor mandatory mediation note that more people
use mediation when it is required3 6 and this means that more
374. Robert Geffner & Mildred Daley Pagelow, Mediation and Child Custody Issues in
Abusive Relationships, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 151, 155 (1990); Joyce, supra note 321, at 452.
375. Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 102; Vincent, supra note 211, at 263.
376. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 407 (1994); MODEL STANDARDS
OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARD, Standard III(C) (2001).
377. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 36 (1994).
378. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard III
(2001).
379. Introduction to the Model Standards, supra note 201, at 12. See MCKNIGHT, supra
note 293, at 18 (discussing initial interview topics).
380. Pearson, supra note 297, at 228.
381. CATHCART & ROBLES, supra note 107, at 38.
382. ELLIS& STUCKLESS,supra note 72, at 103-04; King, supra note 113, at 392-93, 439-40.
383. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 204, at 432.
384. ELLIS, supra note 22, at 78.
385. Pearson, supra note 297, at 325.
386. Vincent, supra note 211, at 283.
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couples are making their own decisions for the future." 7 This is
seen as particularly desirable with respect to child custody
arrangements."' However, in the context of domestic violence,
mandatory mediation may actually be dangerous.
In practice, states have increasingly recognized the danger and
the inappropriateness of requiring abuse survivors to mediate.
Those states with mandatory programs generally provide excep-
tions for domestic violence cases. 8 9 Although California requires
the mediator to meet individually with each party at separate
times,390 states such as Tennessee, 391 Hawaii, 392 and Alabama 393 are
"victim choice" states in that they have adopted an approach similar
to Section 407 of the Model Code which states:
Section 407. Duty of mediator to screen for domestic
violence during mediation referred or ordered by court.
1. A mediator who receives a referral or order from a
court to conduct mediation shall screen for the occur-
rence of domestic or family violence between the
parties.
2. A mediator shall not engage in mediation when it
appears to the mediator or when either party asserts
that domestic or family violence has occurred unless:
(a) Mediation is requested by the victim of the
alleged domestic or family violence;
(b) Mediation is provided in a specialized manner
that protects the safety of the victim by a certi-
fied mediator who is trained in domestic and
family violence; and
(c) The victim is permitted to have in attendance at
mediation a supporting person of his or her
choice, including but not limited to an attorney or
advocate.39 4
This approach allows victims the opportunity to mediate if they
want to do so but does not force them into face-to-face negotiations
with the abuser.3 95
387. Id. at 284.
388. Mary Tall Shattuck, Mandatory Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 191 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1998).
389. Tondo et al., supra note 2, app. at 445.
390. Id. at 435.
391. Id. at 443. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-131 (2001).
392. Tondo et al., supra note 2, at 436. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5 (2001).
393. Tondo et al., supra note 2, at 434. See ALA. CODE § 6-6-20 (2002).
394. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 407 (1994).
395. Of course, mediation cannot go forward without the agreement of the batterer.
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When given the choice whether to mediate, only about 15% of
domestic abuse victims opt out of mediation. However, because all
abusive families are different, each abuse survivor should carefully
consider whether or not mediation is safe and appropriate for her.
The more information she has concerning the benefits and dangers
of mediation, the more informed her choice will be. 96 She must
consider all of her available options in light of her personal history
of abuse and dealings with the abuser.39 7 She may need time to
think about the situation, and the opportunity to discuss her
decision with an advocate or attorney.398
Even though the parties may choose to mediate, that choice is
made subject to the professional judgment of the mediator. The
following list of preconditions for mediation, written by Linda
Girdner at the ABA Center on Children and the Law, provides an
overview of the considerations. Mediators and abuse survivors
should consider whether:
" Each party can make a decision to enter mediation freely
and without coercion.
* Each party enters mediation with informed consent.
Informed means that the parties had the opportunity to
learn about mediation, its pros and cons, and alternatives
to it.
* Each party can provide full disclosure without being afraid
or endangered.
* Each party is aware that he or she can withdraw at
anytime and feels they can do so without retribution.
* Each party is able to recognize that the other party has
rights and needs separate from his or her own.
* Each party recognizes that all mediated outcomes must be
agreed upon voluntarily by both parties.
* Neither party is cognitively or emotionally impaired (e.g.,
severe depression) in any way that affects capacity to
mediate.
* Neither party lacks capacity due to drug or alcohol
abuse.399
Clearly, not all families dealing with abuse will have the capacity
to mediate and they should not be required to do so.
396. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 25.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 26.
399. Id. at 18-19.
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2. Screening for Abuse
Fifty percent of couples now entering mediation programs have
experienced domestic violence. °° Consequently, the Model Code,
the Model Standards, and the American Law Institute4 1' require
that mediators screen for the presence of domestic violence.4 °2
While there is general agreement that screening should take
place, there is little consensus as to exactly how this should be
accomplished. 4°' Because the presence of domestic violence can be
difficult to discern and victims often downplay or deny the abuse,40 4
experts suggest using more than one method of screening. 4°' For
example, mediators might initially use a written questionnaire and
then meet separately with each spouse. Various instruments such
as the Conflict Assessment Scale,4 °6 the Conflict Tactics Scale,4 °v the
Conflict Assessment Protocol, 4°8 the Tolman Screening Model,
409
and others41 ° have been devised. However, screening is more of an
art than a science and the judgment of the screener is an important
factor.4 ' Consequently, some commentators believe that accurate
results are improbable.41 2 In fact, research discloses that only about
5% of cases are excluded from mediation because of domestic
violence.413
This problem is confounded by the finding that as few as 80%
of mediation programs are formally screening for abuse and that
only half of these programs use private interviews in addition to
written questionnaires and observation.4"4 Although increasing
numbers of mediators are using specialized processes such as
400. King, supra note 113, at 443; Pearson, supra note 297, at 320.
401. Reihling, supra note 122, at 399.
402. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 407 (1994); MODEL STANDARDS
OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard X (2001).
403. Introduction to the Model Standards, supra note 201, at 21.
404. Krieger, supra note 286, at 254; Zylstra, supra note 366, at 268.
405. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 15.
406. GARRITY & BARIS, supra note 174, at 42.
407. Nancy R. Rhodes, The Assessment of Spousal Abuse: An Alternative to the Conflict
Tactics Scale, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 28 (Emilio C. Viano
ed., 1992).
408. Fischer et al., supra note 42, at 2156; Zylstra, supra note 366, at 272.
409. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 5.
410. Id. at 17-26; MCKNIGHT,supra note 293, at 14-15; Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 112;
Treuthart, supra note 285, at 724-26.
411. Reihling, supra note 122, at 393 n.139.
412. Id. at 403. See Fischer et al., supra note 42, at 337.
413. Pearson, supra note 297, at 324.
414. Id. at 325; Thoennes et al., supra note 364, at 11-12.
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separate caucuses and co-mediators,415 there is much room for
improvement. Thirty percent of mediators may not be trained
regarding domestic violence and 20% may not be screening for it.41
Nevertheless, attorneys and judges believe that mediators
who are trained to identify abuse and intimidation are in a key
position to do so. They can provide "an institutionalized review of
the cases" whereas outside of mediation, "these matters are less
likely to be either reported by the victims or detected by the
attorneys."417
3. Mediation Triage
As noted previously, mediation should never proceed against
the wishes of the abuse survivor.41 8 However, even when the victim
wants to mediate, there are some conditions under which many
mediators will not agree to mediate. For this reason, the Model
Standards specifically state that some domestic violence situations
"are not suitable for mediation because of safety, control, or
intimidation issues."419
Experts agree that some categories of domestic violence cases
should never be mediated. Erickson and McKnight find mediation
inappropriate when (1) the abuser discounts the victim and refuses
to acknowledge how his behavior affects her, (2) abuse is ongoing
between mediation sessions, (3) either client is carrying a weapon
or attempts to mediate while drinking or using drugs, or (4) either
party continues to violate the mediation ground rules.42 °
Linda Girdner writes that cases should be excluded from
mediation when abuse and/or control are central to the relationship
to such an extent that the parties are unable to differentiate their
interests, the abuser does not accept responsibility for his behavior,
and the victim fears retribution.421  These conditions render the
couple unable to negotiate. In addition, Girdner cautions against
mediation when weapons are involved and/or the abuser has
fantasies of killing the victim and children or committing suicide.422
415. Pearson, supra note 297, at 322, 324-25.
416. Id. at 332.
417. MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 229, at 31-32.
418. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 20.
419. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard XC;
Introduction to the Model Standards, supra note 201, at 20-21.
420. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 284, at 387.
421. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 21-22.
422. Linda K. Girdner, Mediation Triage: Screening for Spouse Abuse in Divorce
Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 365,374 (1990).
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These exclusions are similar to those recommended by Johnston
and Campbell. In a similar vein, Elizabeth Ellis suggests that
mediation may go forward if the violence has been brief, was
instigated by the wife, and/or began only after the separation.423
Because abuse can differ widely in "form, duration, and
severity," the existence of violence creates a red flag for the
mediator signaling a need for a closer look at the victim's ability to
negotiate and the level of the abuser's denial and control.424
If there has been abuse but the identified prohibitions are
absent, mediation might proceed, but only under stringent condi-
tions. These include use of a specially trained mediator, a special-
ized process, and agreed upon safety protocols.425
4. Context and Making Informed Decisions
The abuse survivor is more familiar with her situation than
anyone. Consequently, all process decision-making should start
and end with her. She will have the best information on the
following topics and should consider the following questions.
* The Abuse. As discussed previously, there is a continuum
of abuse and the experience of each victim is unique. What
is the history with respect to the severity, frequency, and
amount of abuse? How recently has the abuse occurred?
Is there a pattern? Is there a culture of battering with
systematic domination and control by the batterer?426
* Immediate Safety Issues. The abuse survivor cannot make
any decisions until she is safe. Has the couple separated?
Is the abuse ongoing? If so, referrals should be made to
community resources and the victim should consider
pursuing a protective order and/or pressing criminal
charges.
* Status of the Abuse Survivor. Is she ready and able to
make decisions? What does she want to happen? Is she
interestedin counseling? Does she need medical treatment
for PTSD?
* Likely Behavior of the Abuser. The abuse survivor is
usually very knowledgeable about how the abuser is likely
to respond to a protective order, criminal charges, and/or
423. ELLIS, supra note 22 at 77.
424. Pearson, supra note 297, at 324.
425. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 20-21; Erickson & McKnight, supra note 284, at 387.
426. Gerencser, supra note 223, at 59.
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mediation. The point of this discussion is not to put his
needs before hers, but to anticipate and avoid future abuse.
" Need for Future Contact. If the couple has children,
especially young ones, there will be some form of future
contact that must be carefully structured.
* Resources. What resources does the victim have? Can she
afford to be represented by an attorney? Is she connected
to an advocate or other support system? Are there other
time and cost issues?
All of these factors can point in different directions and this
makes decision-making difficult. For example, if the abuse survivor
is seriously traumatized, has no children, and can afford an
attorney, she may elect to proceed through the court system. On
the other hand, if the abuse has been less severe and only took
place around the time of the separation, if she has small children,
and if she cannot afford an attorney, exploring mediation might
make sense. Most abuse survivors will fall between these two
scenarios and their decisions will be more complex.
Beyond individual considerations, divorce process decisions
must be made within a larger context. Ideally the abuse survivor
should have access to information about the quality and approach
of the court system as well as the particular mediation process.
Whatever process is chosen, state law will inform the ultimate
outcome. The abuse survivor should be aware of whether the law
provides a rebuttable presumption against custody awards to
batterers or whether custody decisions are made in accordance with
the "best interests" standard. The survivor might also want to
consider whether joint custody is the norm.
If the abuse survivor enters the adversarial system, she should
know whether the judge is likely to be informed about domestic
violence issues. If she enters mediation, she might consider
whether she will have access to a mediator or co-mediators who are
experienced and specially trained to mediate domestic violence
cases. The survivor should also learn whether the mediation will
cover all topics and involve multiple sessions.
The quality of the process may be of more significance than the
process itself. Poorly conducted mediation could be more dangerous
than when unrepresented parties appearing before a well-trained
and sensitive judge. In reality, there is not always a clear choice
between mediation and the adversarial process. For example, a
well-structured, cooperative two-attorney negotiation is more like
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mediation than a contested trial. Consequently, each abuse
survivor must individually evaluate her actual options.
VII. SAFEGUARDS FOR MEDIATING IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
If the couple and mediator agree to proceed with mediation, the
Model Standards provide that safety precautions be taken. These
include the following:
D. If domestic abuse appears to be present the mediator shall
consider taking measures to insure the safety of participants
and the mediator including, among others;
1. establishing appropriate security arrangements.
2. holding separate sessions with the participants even
without the agreement of all participants;
3. allowing a friend, representative, advocate, counsel, or
attorney to attend the mediation sessions;
4. encouraging the participants to be represented by an
attorney, counsel or an advocate throughout the
mediation process;
5. referring the participants to appropriate community
resources; and
6. suspending or terminating the mediation sessions,
with appropriate steps to protect the safety of the
participants.
E. The mediator should facilitate the participants' formulation
of parenting plans that protect the physical safety and psycho-
logical well-being of themselves and their children.
427
A. Procedures and Ground Rules
As noted previously, the time of separation is potentially one of
the most dangerous for the abuse survivor."" Research shows that
73% to 96% of mediation programs use special techniques and
procedures when mediating cases involving domestic violence.4 2 9
For example, physical safety can be enhanced by providing separate
427. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARD,
Standard XD (2001).
428. Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 98.
429. Pearson, supra note 297, at 326; Thoennes et al., supra note 364, at 19-20.
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waiting rooms, staggering arrival and departure, and providing an
escort to and from the car.43
0
Conditions for the mediation should be in writing and reviewed
during each session.43' For example, all abuse should be prohibited
and both parties must agree that stopping the abuse is not a
negotiable issue.432  Likewise, drug and alcohol use should be
prohibited.433 The basic ground rules for conduct in mediation
should be clarified. These include respectful and appropriate use
of language and gestures, not interrupting, and not touching the
other person.434 Conduct outside the mediation sessions should be
spelled out including whether any contact outside of the sessions
will be permitted and if so, setting clear boundaries regarding
telephone, e-mail, and face-to-face contact.
435
With respect to mediation procedure, the use of male and
female co-mediators is advised whenever possible.436 Separate
initial screening and caucusing allow the mediator to monitor
whether agreements are being made voluntarily.437 When domestic
violence has occurred, mediators downplay the importance of
reaching an agreement and are prepared to terminate the media-
tion if necessary.43 Mediators also report that they are more active
and directive in these sessions and that they encourage more
detailed and specific agreements.439
If the couple has children, clear and detailed rules must be
established to prevent child abuse and determine whether visitation
will be supervised.44 ° In most cases, the parents will continue to
have contact concerning the children and this must be planned in
detail in order to avoid future conflict and potential abuse. 441' Given
the trend toward joint custody in mediated and adversarial
proceedings and the link between domestic violence and child
abuse,442 special care must be taken to keep the parents focused on
the safety needs of the children.443 If not carefully structured,
430. Fuller & Lyons, supra note 214, at 926; Zylstra, supra note 366, at 277.
431. JACOBSON & GoTrMAN, supra note 8, at 229.
432. Goodmark, supra note 147, at 26; Fuller & Lyons, supra note 214, at 923.
433. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 284, at 384.
434. McKNIGHT, supra note 293, at 22; GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 40.
435. Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 3, at 313.
436. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 38.
437. Rimelspach, supra note 103, at 108.
438. Pearson, supra note 297, at 326.
439. Id. at 326-27.
440. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 284, at 383.
441. Id. at 377; Elrod, supra note 111, at 528.
442. MASON, supra note 332, at 237; Treuthart, supra note 285, at 734.
443. Fuller & Lyons, supra note 214, at 916; Magana & Taylor, supra note 293, at 54.
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studies have shown that visitation in situations of high conflict can
be detrimental rather than helpful to children.444 Rather than
working toward co-parenting when abuse has occurred, "parallel"
parenting governed by a specific structured parenting plan may be
more appropriate.445
B. Reporting
Although mediation sessions are confidential, an exception
must be made for threatening behavior. Under the Model Stan-
dards, mediators are allowed to disclose threats of suicide or threats
of violence against another person.446 Similarly, the Uniform
Mediation Act allows disclosure of threats to "inflict bodily injury
or commit a crime of violence."44 v Mediators are advised to put
these and related child abuse reporting exceptions in writing before
any mediation begins." 8
C. Presence of Attorneys
Attorney representation should be encouraged in cases where
domestic violence is an issue. Research in Maine has shown that
the presence of attorneys moderates power imbalances and
decreases the likelihood of unfairness.449 The attorney can act as a
support person and as a spokesperson for the victim. 450 In the
absence of an attorney, an advocate or friend can provide additional
support.45'
D. Monitoring for Signs and Abuse and Terminating Mediation
Because screening is not always accurate and abuse is common,
mediators should assume that domestic violence may be present in
any mediation. Consequently, the mediator has an ongoing
444. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Supervised Visitation: The Families and Their
Experiences, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 123, 124 (2000).
445. Johnston, supra note 140, at 469.
446. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard VIIC
(2001).
447. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(3).
448. Introduction to the Model Standards, supra note 201, at 23.
449. Craig McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN.
L. REV. 1317, 1376 (1995).
450. Id. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1597 (1991).
451. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 407(2)(C) (1994).
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obligation to screen for abuse and to evaluate the suitability of
continuing with the mediation.452 Conduct to watch for includes
fearful body language, one party dominating the discussion,
difficulty expressing needs, put-downs, and so forth.453 Even though
mediation has begun, either party or the mediator should have the
freedom to terminate it at any time.4 4
The Model Standards provide for seven different situations
when the mediator is called upon to terminate the mediation.
Standard XI
A family mediator shall suspend or terminate the mediation
process when the mediator reasonably believes that a partici-
pant is unable to effectively participate or for other compelling
reasons.
A. Circumstances under which a mediator should consider
suspending or terminating the mediation, may include, among
others:
1. the safety of a participant or well-being of a child is
threatened;
2. a participant has or is threatening to abduct a child;
3. a participant is unable to participate due to the influ-
ence of drugs, alcohol, or physical or mental condition;
4. the participants are about to enter into an agreement
that the mediator reasonably believes to be unconscionable;
5. a participant is using the mediation to further illegal
conduct;
6. a participant is using the mediation process to gain an
unfair advantage; and
7. if the mediator believes that the mediator's impartiality
has been compromised in accordance with Standard IV.
B. If the mediator does suspend or terminate the media-
tion, the mediator should take all reasonable steps to minimize
prejudice or inconvenience to the participants which may
result.455
Because terminating the mediation may put the domestic
violence victim at additional risk, care must be taken to prepare the
parties. Typically, this is done in a separate caucus where options
can be discussed and appropriate community referrals made.45 6
452. Zylstra, supra note 366, at 275.
453. Id. at 275-76.
454. Fuller & Lyons, supra note 214, at 925.
455. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard XI
(2001). See also Davis & Salem, supra note 338, at 24; Zylstra, supra note 366, at 279.
456. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 32.
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When meeting with the abuser, no insinuation should be made that
the termination is the fault of the victim.
457
For whatever reason the mediation is terminated, including
attempted reconciliation of the parties, the victim should have a
safety plan.458 If the woman decides to return to the abusive
relationship, it may be possible to make a plan for counseling and
an agreement about the future conduct of the parties.45 9
E. Criminal Charges and Orders for Protection
Even if mediation is continuing, the victim should be encour-
aged to explore obtaining an order for protection and filing criminal
charges. These strategies can provide additional protection for the
victim while the divorce is mediated and finalized. Referrals should
also be made to community resources.460
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Safety
Before any decisions can be made regarding the choice of
divorce process, the victim and children need to be safe. This is
particularly true in situations where the abuse is ongoing, severe,
and frequent. When violence has occurred, the victim should be
assisted in developing a safety plan and she should seriously
consider obtaining an order for protection and possibly pursuing
criminal charges.
B. Victim Choice and the Model Code
When domestic violence has occurred, divorce mediation should
only take place if requested by the victim. To this end, all states
should adopt statutes similar to Section 407 of the Model Code
which provides that when domestic violence has taken place,
mediation may proceed if requested by the victim and conducted by
a trained mediator using a specialized procedure. 461' The victim
should be allowed to have a support person, including an attorney
or advocate, present during the mediation sessions.
457. Barsky, supra note 348, at 20.
458. JACOBSON & GO'IrMAN, supra note 8, at 248.
459. Yellott, supra note 289, at 43.
460. GIRDNER, supra note 24, at 44; Fischer et al., supra note 42, at 2154.
461. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE §§ 407,408 (1994)
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C. Informed Decision Making
The ultimate decision about whether to mediate must rest with
the abuse victim. In order to make an informed decision, the victim
will need to examine her personal situation and compare the
specific options actually available to her. These considerations and
options will vary from case to case. However, the factors in Fig. 1
may be useful in making an informed decision.
D. State Law
State family law provides the foundation for both mediated and
adversarial divorce. Abuse survivors should be offered the opportu-
nity to seek protective orders and file criminal charges. States
should clarify their existing statutes with respect to the connection
between battering and child abuse by adopting protective provisions
such as the rebuttable presumption against the batterer being
awarded custody and related provisions contained in the Model
Code.462 Whatever process is chosen, the children must be pro-
tected.
E. Adversarial System Reforms
Reforms are needed in the way that the adversarial system
handles domestic violence cases. For example, when domestic
violence is an issue in a divorce action, both parties should be
represented by attorneys to "level the playing field," to make sure
that relevant information is brought forth, and to provide support
for the victim. In addition, attorneys should, within the bounds of
professional responsibility, moderate their traditional role as
zealous advocates in favor of a more collaborative approach. Judges
who make decisions for families should have in-depth, ongoing
training concerning domestic violence, child psychology, and family
dynamics.
F. Mediation Reforms
Mediation should be undertaken using safeguards designed to.
protect victims of domestic violence. It should be a voluntary, not
mandatory, option for abuse survivors. Mediators should be trained
462. Id. at § 403.
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to screen for and otherwise recognize abuse. In addition, special-
ized training and certification should be required for those under-
taking cases involving domestic violence. This process may include
performance and skills testing as well as a period of case supervi-
sion. A specialized procedure including ground rules, safety
planning, separate caucuses, and the presence of attorneys and
support people should be tailored to the needs of each couple.
Mediation should not be limited in duration and should cover all of
the issues needing resolution.
IX. CONCLUSION
Should abuse victims mediate their divorces? In some cases,
the answer is "no." In others, the answer is "maybe" but only on a
voluntary basis with a highly skilled mediator using a specialized
procedure. Even then, the decision regarding mediation must be
made with regard for the victim's particular situation and the
options realistically available. As Jessica Pearson observes, the
time has come to replace bright-line solutions with more customized
procedures:
At the end of the twentieth century, there is growing recogni-
tion that families with legal problems are extremely different
and need a variety of dispute resolution forums. This is true for
families with and without domestic violence. It is impossible to
proscribe the legal court intervention that would best serve all
battered women given the different profiles of domestic violence
offenders, victims, and episodes of abuse. Disputes between and
among family members involve complicated relationships;
courts are learning that they must "customize" their
responses.46 3
Thus, mediation should be offered as one option among
many.4 64 Abuse survivors must be informed of choices, educated
about the advantages and disadvantages of each, and counseled
with respect to what might work for them. They and their families
deserve no less.
463. Court Services, supra note 126, at 631.
464. Elrod, supra note 111, at 517; Court Services, supra note 126, at 617 n.53.
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Fig. 1. Summary of Contextual Factors to be Considered in
Choosing a Divorce Process
Factors Indicators Consistent Indicators
With Choice of Consistent With
Adversarial System Choice of Mediation
Type of -Walker's cycle of violence.* -Johnson and
Violence -Johnston and Campbell's Campbell's female-
Experienced ongoing and episodic male initiated violence or
battering or psychotic and male-controlling
paranoid reactions.* interactive violence or
-Ellis and Stuckless' control separation-engendered
instigated violence.* and post divorce
trauma.*
-Ellis and Stuckless'
conflict instigated
violence.*
Frequency and -Ongoing and severe abuse. -Abuse not presently
Severity of occurring.
Abuse
Victim Status -Victim suffers from PTSD or -Victim able and
depression willing to state her
-Victim intimidated and fears needs, problem solve,
retribution. and make own
decisions.
Likely Abuser -Abuser likely to comply with -Abuser likely to
Response court orders. comply with voluntary
agreements.
Quality of the -Judges specially trained and -Specially trained and
Process experienced in handling experienced mediator
domestic violence cases. who implements and
-Timely access to the courts. enforces safeguards.
-No limit on number of
sessions.
-Includes mediation of
all issues (custody,
parenting time,
property, support).
Legal -Victim represented by an -Victim representation
Representation attorney. important and very
-Attorney experienced with helpful but not as
domestic violence cases. critical as in adversary
system.
Presence of -Couple has no children or -Couple has children
Children other need for ongoing (especially if young)
contacts, and will have ongoing
contact that must be
carefully structured to
ensure safeTy.
State Law -State law provides for a -Mediation process
rebuttable presumption helped by
against award of custody to presumptions against
batterer. award of custody to
-State law includes a batterer and against
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presumption against joint joint custody but
custody if domestic abuse has mediation process not
taken place. entirely dependent
upon it.
Financial -Victim able to afford -Victim has limited
Resources extended litigation and hiring financial resources.
of experts.
Decision -Victim is comfortable with or -Victim prefers to make
Making favors possibility of a judge her own decisions for
Approach making decisions for the the future within the
future. mediation context.
'See Section II.D.
